NATO's delicate balancing act in the Indo-Pacific

The claim that “security is indivisible,” the guiding principle of liberal democracies since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, sounds reassuring but, upon a little reflection, quickly becomes unsatisfying.

Constant repetition has not answered the most important question: What does “indivisible” mean in practice?

Precision is tricky when “strategic ambiguity” — uncertainty about the exact response to an adversary’s aggression to complicate its calculations and enhance deterrence — has become the coin of the realm. But ambiguity also affects allies and partners, and their expectations are as important, if not more so, as those of adversaries.

As the world gets smaller, the interests of like-minded countries are more tightly coupled than ever before and the impacts of revisionism and aggression ripple around the world more quickly than ever, it is critically important to fill in some of the blanks and complete the picture when assessing NATO’s role in the Indo-Pacific.

Every conversation starts with acknowledgement that there is a role and that what happens in one theater affects another. Asia’s central position in the global economy, providing crucial nodes in global supply chains as well as markets for goods, is the most immediate concern.

There is also recognition that China is a revisionist power that aims to not only redraw borders but rewrite rules as well. Officials and experts speak of a “systemic challenge to security, democracy and our way of life,” that can only be repulsed if nations of the trans-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific communities act together. Julianne Smith, U.S. ambassador to NATO, explained that “in an era of strategic competition, where the core principles of international security are certainly contested, NATO must work even more closely with like-minded countries.”

Or, as Keio University scholar Michito Tsuruoka summarized in a recent analysis, “the alliance does not have the luxury of being indifferent to the Indo-Pacific region as things that happen there affect NATO countries’ economic and security interests more directly than they did before.”

To be clear, though, military action by NATO is off the table. David van Weel, NATO assistant secretary-general for emerging security challenges, has been blunt, telling the Nikkei for example, that he couldn’t envision a military role for the alliance in this theater and denying that the organization has any such intent. That message has been repeated at every NATO-focused conference I’ve attended in recent weeks (and there have been a lot), with a variety of officials emphasizing that the organization “has no military aspirations for the region” nor does it intend to add members from the region.

An informal survey of European Japan experts revealed no dissent from that view. Marie Soderberg, professor at the European Institute of Japanese Studies and chairperson of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, offered a typical reply via email, explaining that “in northern Europe the focus is definitely not on the Indo-Pacific. NATO, which Sweden will finally be joining very soon, is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and Sweden is joining not about worries for what is happening in the Indo-Pacific. ... Do not think, at least North European countries are interested in getting involved more than necessary in the Indo-Pacific.”

That doesn’t mean the organization will sit on its hands. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has said that Tokyo will expect Europe to send weapons and ammunition in a regional contingency — the same aid that Asian nations have dispatched to Ukraine. Before that fatal moment, however, strategists encouraged European governments to send signals of support, such as more frequent deployments of naval and other assets to the region.

In most cases, those assets will carry the flag of individual countries, rather than NATO. But, explained Tsuruoka, that aligns with Japan’s own preferences. “More frequent and robust deployments, including those that involve high-end capabilities, are likely to influence Beijing’s risk evaluation and strategic calculations, and so should not be dismissed as token gestures.”

In a conflict, war will be fought in new and different ways, exploiting the national vulnerabilities that are inherent in digital societies. Cyberspace will be one battle-space as adversaries try to destabilize critical infrastructure. They will also exploit social fissures through disinformation campaigns, trying to weaken the will to resist and fight.

Japan and NATO are already working together on new technologies and on efforts to safeguard the new domains of cyber, outer space and other vectors “that are not constrained by national boundaries.” Cyber is the first area of cooperation in the NATO-Japan Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme, and Japan has joined NATO’s annual cyberexercises since 2021.

When eight NATO ambassadors met with Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa earlier this month, their statement identified cyber, space and maritime security as priorities. The July update to the Japan-NATO partnership agreement deems disinformation a new threat and Tokyo will work more closely with the alliance to enhance its ability to respond in this area.

Van Weel’s portfolio is emerging security challenges and he aims to deepen cooperation with Japan on artificial intelligence and quantum computing. He insists that maintaining the West’s technological edge “will help us in the larger battle for democracy.”

A key role for NATO and its member countries will be backing economic sanctions in the event of crisis. That will be part of a concerted diplomatic offensive in global and regional institutions to build as wide a coalition as possible to counter revisionist powers and roll back their efforts to rewrite international rules and redraw national boundaries. As the experience following the Ukraine invasion makes clear, such support cannot be taken for granted.

NATO has been making all the right noises, but nothing can be assumed. Masahiro Matsumura, professor of international politics at St. Andrew's University in Osaka, warned that “many European countries are reluctant to take a confrontational security approach toward China to preserve robust trade and economic ties.” Like so many other countries, “European countries are caught between a rock and a hard place amid the U.S.-China face-off.”

Those tensions were exposed last summer when NATO failed to open a liaison office in Tokyo. There were a considerable number of reports that the organization would in fact proceed, suggesting that either the deal was done or the pressure to do so was being intensified.

Ultimately, nothing happened and most analysis focused on the opposition of French President Emmanuel Macron. He was said to be worried that the agreement would increase tension with China and threatened to distract the organization from its primary focus on the defense of Europe (an understandable concern given the fight in Ukraine). Some reports noted that his opposition hardened after a trip to Beijing in April yielded a commitment to buy 160 Airbus jets. Macron also underscored the need for Europe to maintain “strategic autonomy,” a diplomat’s way of expressing misgivings about being too ready to give into U.S. pressure.

China has fed that complaint. One diplomat in Europe accused NATO of “making groundless accusations, meddling in affairs beyond its borders and creating confrontation,” and warned against an “eastward movement into the Asia-Pacific region.” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin piled on, calling on NATO to “quit the outdated Cold War mentality” and stop seeking to “sow chaos here in the Asia-Pacific or elsewhere in the world.”

If expectations are calibrated, then NATO is unbowed. Its rhetoric is strong and the organization is trying to strengthen deterrence, deter adventurism and avoid over-extension. The greatest danger, warned Michael Reiterer, former EU ambassador to South Korea who is currently a visiting professor at Ritsumeikan University, is overplaying its hand, raising expectations and creating a credibility gap. NATO and Japan seem to have taken that concern to heart.