Camp David success depends on convincing the public

According to Albert Einstein, the Camp David agreement reached by Japan, South Korea and the United States two weeks ago is insane.

Since Einstein died in 1955, he didn’t actually comment on the deal. But applying his definition of insanity — doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result — to the deal leaves a pretty clear conclusion.

In fact, a history of resounding failure may be the best thing going for that agreement. If the three countries can learn from past mistakes, then there is real hope for a long-lasting accord. That is, however, a big “if.”

The Camp David statement is an important declaration of shared purpose and principles; it sets the three countries on the path toward substantive cooperation on the Korean Peninsula and significantly beyond and throughout the wider Indo-Pacific region. The summit was the fourth among the three leaders — Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden — all of which had been building to the agreements announced at their get-together. The meeting was originally scheduled for the Group of Seven summit Kishida hosted in Hiroshima in May but was postponed after the budget crisis forced Biden to cut that trip short.

The declaration and its related initiatives have been applauded by regional security experts — and roundly criticized by China and North Korea. And yet, there is no ignoring the sad history of bilateral and trilateral initiatives that included these same three countries.

They formed the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) to facilitate cooperation during the implementation of the 1994 nuclear agreement between the U.S. and North Korea. Working together on shared security concerns prodded Tokyo and Seoul to sign the historic 1998 agreement between then-Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung. The two men agreed to look forward, not back, and is held out as the model for all bilateral agreements. President Yoon uses it as his lodestar.

Agreement to jointly host the 2002 FIFA World Cup symbolized the two nations’ rapprochement and the tournament’s success showed that a commitment to cooperation would yield tangible benefits. No list of accomplishments leave out the 2015 agreement on "comfort women," women who suffered under Japan’s military brothel system before and during World War II, that was supposed to “finally and irreversibly” resolve that issue between the two countries.

All those agreements and deals collapsed under the weight of historical legacies and contemporary political pressures. The key then to the survival and success of this deal is insulating it from political counter-currents since, as Scott Snyder and I argued in “The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash,” politicians exploit that history and use it as a cudgel against their opponents for domestic advantage, even if the country’s foreign policy is undermined as a result.

All accounts of the Camp David agreement credit a desire on the part of the three parties to institutionalize the relationships, both bilateral and trilateral, to do just that. By creating reservoirs of trust and habits of cooperation among the three countries — most especially between Japan and South Korea — the three publics and their governments will recognize that their futures are deeply intertwined and security for one means security for all, or put another way, insecurity for one means insecurity for all.

At Camp David, the three leaders agreed to regularize meetings and consultations at all levels of government, from heads of state to working-level bureaucrats, on issues ranging from defense to development and science to technology. They will work together to address challenges all over the world, most immediately from North Korea but even addressing those in the South Pacific.

To call this a new alliance goes too far. The three governments will work more closely together and consult more regularly, but this continues to be a network of two alliances rather than a merger.

“This is not nothing,” said Walter Hatch, professor emeritus at Colby College and a longtime student of the region, but it’s not enough. He argues that the key to enduring ties is genuine reconciliation among Japan and South Korea. That requires far more than leaders’ statements and over-the-horizon efforts to promote shared security. As he explained in his new book “Ghosts in the Neighborhood” (reviewed in The Japan Times last weekend), Japan must accept measures that effectively limit its autonomy.

Apologies and speeches about a shared future ring empty in the absence of commitments that make them real. Germany took that fateful step when it joined NATO and the European Union, two institutions designed, in the famous maxim, “to keep Germany down. ...” By effectively tying its hands and ensuring that its fate was intertwined with that of its neighbors, Germany convinced those neighbors of its sincerity. Japan hasn’t gone that far, yet.

Hatch worries about the future of the Camp David agreement because Japanese concessions have been minimal — restoring South Korea to the white list of trade partners — and a perception among South Koreans that Tokyo is “acting under pressure from its military guardian, the United States. They will remain skeptical that Japan is truly willing to cooperate with Korea as an equal partner, on its own free will.”

In an email, he called for Washington to push the Kishida administration to take the lead on initiatives to build closer ties with Japan's neighborhood. Unfortunately, U.S. pressure perpetuates the image of Japan as a reluctant participant.

Instead, Tokyo must be seen as acting on its own. That will be tough because suspicion of South Korea runs high in Japan and Kishida is considered a weak prime minister, unable to challenge more powerful conservative forces that doubt Seoul’s commitment to enduring reconciliation. They are convinced that progressive forces will return to power and rip up any agreement with Japan to seize the moral high ground.

There are two bulwarks against that future. The first is a belligerent North Korea, one that genuinely threatens South Korea and leaves little room for the triangulation that previous progressive governments used to marginalize relations with Japan. Fortunately, there is little sign that Pyongyang is prepared to moderate its policy and provide that room for diplomatic maneuver.

(Ironically, a North Korean hard line undercuts incentives for Tokyo to change policy since officials will assume that Seoul won’t have options other than closer ties with Japan.)

The second bulwark is a consensus among the three publics to have an integrated future. Political leaders can’t exploit divisions if wedge issues don’t exist. Public opinion is hard to move, especially when it has been reinforced by national political identity in each country. Hard is not impossible, however.

Building support for partnership means making the benefits of that partnership visible. Previous agreements institutionalized bureaucratic ties and it was difficult for ordinary citizens to appreciate the good that did for them. The new deal risks making the same mistake. To make the most of it, there should be lavish attention on the trilateral meetings, with continuing emphasis on how they support each country’s security and prosperity. The public must see how these arrangements work for them.

But that isn’t enough. There must also be a focus on grassroots activity. Exchanges should be promoted, travel facilitated — whatever it takes to bring the publics together to see and enjoy all that they share. The divisions that have undermined Japan-South Korea relations are based on the idea that the two sets of national interests are at their root fundamentally inconsistent. Policy makers must show the two publics that that is not the case.

When they succeed in that endeavor Tokyo and Seoul can use those lessons to ensure that their bonds with Washington remain strong as well — that will be the next challenge for the Camp David agreement.