U.S. President Donald Trump's decision to cancel the historic summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un next month in Singapore was, oddly, no great surprise. The entire process, beginning with Trump's initial agreement to meet with Kim, appears to have been guided by impulse, with little of the systematic assessment and strategizing that typically dominates such moments. Japan must work with the United States to prevent a return to the antagonism that marked U.S.-North Korea relations prior to Kim's opening to the West earlier this year, as well as to keep together the coalition that is maintaining "maximum pressure" on Pyongyang.
There were many signs that the June 12 summit was in trouble. North Korea had become increasingly critical of U.S. demands for denuclearization and was attacking U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton and Vice President Mike Pence by name because of their support for the "Libyan model" — that country gave up its nuclear program in 2003 in exchange for the lifting of international sanctions but less than a decade later leader Moammar Gadhafi was killed by rebel forces. Trump promised that Kim would stay in power and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo added that the U.S. would "work with North Korea to achieve prosperity on the par with our South Korean friends."
Those assurances were not enough for the North. Pyongyang continued its invective and did not send officials to summit planning meetings. This prompted Trump to decide that the risks of failure — or seeming weak by appearing to want the summit too much — were too great. In a letter to Kim, Trump said he would not tolerate the "tremendous anger and open hostility" directed at the U.S. by North Korea and reminded the North Korean leader of a U.S. nuclear arsenal that is "so massive and powerful that I pray to God they will never have to be used." He left the door open to the resumption of dialogue, however, noting that he "very much looks forward to meeting" Kim and invited him to call or write any time.