The Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) that had been given preliminary approval by peace panels of the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Kuala Lumpur on July 27 stands as the only agreement in the annals of the peace process in the Philippines that has elicited so much euphoria, as it was about to end the age-old secessionist challenge in the southern Philippines.

Yet, eight days before the scheduled signing at Putrajaya, Malaysia, the promise of the MOA-AD degenerated and subsequently triggered the launch of a new round of conflict between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the MILF.

This conflict has so far resulted in the deaths of many combatants, scores of non-combatants, displaced thousands of civilians, women and children, and destroyed infrastructure, especially in mainland Mindanao.

The MOA-AD is an agreement between the Philippine government and the MILF about the area that presently constitutes the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, including the additional land area and maritime resources that will be added after the successful conduct of a plebiscite in August 2009.

Three months thereafter, the "Comprehensive Compact" should have been signed to provide political structure and a system of governance for a new political entity called the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). Quite simply, the areas identified in the MOA-AD cannot be included immediately in the BJE until a plebiscite is held.

The MOA-AD is envisioned to entrench "the Bangsamoro homeland as a territorial space to secure [sic] Moro identity and posterity, to protect their property rights and resources as well as to establish a system of governance suitable and acceptable to them as a distinct dominant people."

While the MOA-AD is silent on specific issues about governance in the BJE, the latter was slated to be the subject of the next stage of negotiation that will eventually discuss the Comprehensive Compact, to commence the BJE immediately or after a period of transition until its formal creation.

There is no doubt that the incremental and cumulative approach of the peace process has elicited windfall concessions in favor of the MILF. Starting in 1997, the GRP-MILF peace process had undergone twists and turns, leaving the peace process hanging in suspended animation at times. With the MOA-AD, the MILF has made the Philippine government, through the BJE, commit to secure and preserve the ancestral domains of the Bangsamoro people.

By a radical twist of fate, what should have been a seminal agreement was too good to be true. The travails started when the Supreme Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the MOA-AD, thus suspending its scheduled signing. The highest court of the land responded to a group of opposition members, mostly local government officials in North Cotabato, Iligan and Zamboanga that questioned its constitutionality. They also claimed a lack of transparency and consultation in the entire process. It alleged that the MOA-AD arbitrarily included some of the areas under their purview without their consent and without consulting the people of these regions.

In response, a group of frustrated MILF renegades led by Commanders Kato and Bravo attacked the areas in North Cotabato, Lanal del Norte and Saranggani, triggering a massive military response from the AFP and putting on hold the peace talks with the MILF leadership.

In a sense, the Supreme Court's granting of a TRO to halt the MOA's signing is a case of premature intervention by the judiciary on the power of the Executive to close a peace deal with the MILF. The Supreme Court preempted the fundamental function of Congress to craft laws by practically lording it over the political and legislative functions of both the executive and legislature, a sheer case of throwing a monkey wrench at the principle of a separation of powers under any Republican system of government.

Apart from concealing the deliberations under the cloak of secrecy, this happened because the executive had been remiss in engaging a comprehensive approach on the peace process, a fundamental defect that had been evident since day one of the peace talks. If the executive had been in full control, transparent and pro-active in dealing with other branches of government, including the local government, the Supreme Court would not have halted the MOA-AD. By extension, it would have not succumbed to pressure from vested interests in Mindanao, which have been opposed not only to the MOA-AD, but the peace process in general.

The shortcomings of the executive is highlighted more fundamentally when, upon closer scrutiny, it becomes apparent that Malacanang (the Philippine president's administration) lacked a clear timetable of the peace process. It should have made the peace process a national policy and closed the peace deal with the MILF early so that the remaining years in office of President Gloria Arroyo could be used to shepherd the implementation of the peace agreement with the MILF.

In its absence, the MOA-AD has now unleashed a national uproar, especially from opposition politicians with presidential ambitions. They ride on speculation that the MOA-AD was surreptitiously hatched by Arroyo to justify a constitutional amendment in order to change the Philippines political set up — a federalist system including a possible shift from presidential to a parliamentary system of government, an act that may allow Arroyo to extend her term beyond 2010.

Whatever the veracity of such claims, the MOA-AD and the whole peace process have been held to hostage by politics from within the national government, transforming it from being a promising settlement into a source of political ferment. What it has succeeded to do is to trigger the resurrection of anti-Moro sentiment nationwide.

Julkipli Wadi is an associate professor of Islamic Studies at the University of the Philippines. © 2008 OpinionAsia (www.opinionasia.org)