A um Shinrikyo's terrorism of 10 years ago has traditionally been viewed though a domestic political prism, one that saw the act as the outgrowth of a uniquely Japanese set of circumstances. In fact, Aum was a harbinger of the future: It was less interested in political theater than killing large numbers of people and intimidating the Tokyo government. The assault exposed vulnerabilities in responding to a bio-terror attack. Remarkably, many of those problems have not been fixed.
On March 20, 1995, five members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult punctured plastic bags filled with sarin nerve gas on Tokyo subways during the morning rush hour in an attempt to paralyze the government of Japan and sow terror in the capital. The attack failed. The cult intended to kill thousands of people; instead, only 12 people died, although 5,000 others were hospitalized.
The Aum attack was the most high-profile bio-terror assault in modern history, but there have been others. A cult in Oregon laced a salad bar with salmonella in an attempt to influence local elections. No one died, but the attack again made plain how vulnerable most communities are. Unknown groups or individuals have sent anthrax and other biological agents through the U.S. and British mail. Again, the number of fatalities has been small, but vulnerabilities were made apparent.