HONOLULU -- North Korea never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity. The latest example occurred last week when Pyongyang precipitated yet another breakdown in the North-South dialogue process, thus dealing a staggering blow to South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's beleaguered "sunshine policy" of engagement with the North.

North Korea's actions will reduce hopes for a resumption of dialogue with the United States and could cause Pyongyang's other Western interlocutors to rethink the wisdom of strengthening their own ties with the unpredictable regime.

Just two months ago the North-South dialogue process seemed to have gained new life. Pyongyang agreed, after a six month hiatus, to resume high-level dialogue with the South. Resumed talks in Seoul on Sept. 15-18 appeared promising, as new objectives were set and promises were made regarding future meetings and proposed joint efforts.

However, at the recently concluded sixth round of minister-level talks, the North again went out of its way to undermine the dialogue process and, with it, the hopes and dreams of Kim. Most cruelly, the North pulled the rug out from under what was to be the fourth family exchange program, which brings together relatives divided since the Korean War for brief, tightly controlled, visits.

For South Korea, the exchange program was one of the most important breakthroughs achieved at the historic North-South summit meeting between Kim and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in June 2000. Tens of thousands of elderly South Korean residents have been lining up for a chance to visit long lost kin and, for many, time is rapidly running out. Of the 200 chosen by lottery for the fourth exchange visit, more than a dozen have already died as the North continues to renege on its promise.

Pyongyang "postponed" the scheduled October family visits, claiming that conditions would not be right for such meetings or for future high level talks in the South until Seoul took its forces off their "9/11" alert. The fact that the alert was already in place when North Korean delegates visited Seoul on Sept. 15 and agreed to a resumption of dialogue and family visits makes this argument disingenuous.

At a recent conference on "Korea and the Search for Peace in Northeast Asia" in Kyoto, many North Korea specialists argued that the North sees little value in interacting with a lame duck president in the South and that it is now up to the U.S. to revive the Peninsula peace process.

But, as one participant wryly noted, it was North Korean actions that prematurely lamed the duck. By missing yet another opportunity to get North-South dialogue back on track, the North has reduced the likelihood of rapprochement with the U.S. as well, especially since the North continues to insist that U.S. President George W. Bush "return to the policies of his predecessor" as a precondition to a resumption of dialogue.

The North Korean approach seems based on two false premises: (1) that the U.S. needs the dialogue more than the North and is thus willing to bend over backward to accommodate Pyongyang's unrealistic demands; and (2) that the longer Pyongyang stalls, the more willing Washington (and Seoul) will be to reward the North for future cooperation.

Many blame the Clinton administration's apparent over-eagerness to arrange a presidential visit to Pyongyang in its waning days with reinforcing this North Korean mind set. But remember that Clinton did not go since Pyongyang would not agree in advance to satisfy U.S. concerns regarding its missile program, promising only that problems would be solved once Clinton visited. The lesson Pyongyang should have learned was that there will be no "faith-based" agreement with Washington. Pyongyang will have to make verifiable concessions (and deliver on already-made promises) for any hope of meaningful cooperation.

This does not mean that Washington is unwilling to talk with Pyongyang. For months, the Bush administration has expressed willingness to conduct a "comprehensive dialogue" with North Korea, but Pyongyang seems to be holding out for a better deal. My guess is that Washington's pledge to hold discussions "anytime, anyplace, without preconditions" is as good an offer as the North is going to get. This is even more true today, given other more pressing concerns and North Korea's failure to jump fully on board the antiterrorism bandwagon.

To its credit, Pyongyang has strongly condemned the Sept. 11 attack and signaled its willingness to sign the U.N. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. But Pyongyang continues to strongly criticize U.S. military action in Afghanistan and has refused to take concrete measures to remove itself from the U.S. State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Had Pyongyang agreed to expel five fugitive hijackers from a Japanese Red Army faction that have enjoyed more than 30 years of asylum in North Korea, it would have likely been dropped from the list prior to Sept. 11.

A resumption of North-South dialogue is also still possible, but Pyongyang's past behavior has made Kim Dae Jung so weak politically that he now has virtually no flexibility in dealing with the North. There is little opportunity today for further South Korean concessions. But this does not mean that it would be wise for Pyongyang to wait things out until after the December 2002 South Korean elections. Any successor to Kim Dae Jung, regardless of party affiliation, will probably feel compelled to take a more hardline approach and demand much greater reciprocity in dealing with Pyongyang, especially if the North continues to break promises.

Once the South Korean presidential campaign gets into full swing the window of opportunity for improved North-South relations will close. And even if Pyongyang finally sees the wisdom of resuming its dialogue with Washington, it should realize that the Bush administration is not likely to let its own dialogue with the North outpace the North-South effort.

Kim Dae Jung's sunshine policy offered North Korea its last, best hope for peace and stability on the Peninsula and for greater international acceptability. Will it miss yet another opportunity?