WASHINGTON -- While the world's eyes were fixed on Hainan Island off the coast of China, Macedonia's ethnic Albanian rebels were completing a tactical retreat after an offensive by government forces. Some hope that Macedonia's government will now, as expected, offer greater political rights to its ethnic Albanian minority and that the looming civil war in that country may be defused. In that event, NATO could safely remain on the sidelines of the conflict. There is also hope that peace will finally descend on the Balkans now that former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic is out of the way.

We should be so lucky. More likely, ethnic Albanian fighters have probably simply chosen to postpone their real fight until the summer, as they had originally planned. The fact that no side suffered many casualties in the recent fighting in Macedonia suggests that the Albanian extremists opted to disengage. It does not mean that they were defeated on the battlefield. Perhaps they will give up the fight if Macedonian Albanians are granted better political treatment, including the right to use their own language for various official purposes. But they may really want war in the belief that in the end they will gain more land for a greater Albania.

If so, that is very bad news. According to the best estimates, there are more than 1,000 ethnic Albanian rebels prepared to fight Macedonia's military. That is more than Macedonia could probably defeat. Classic counterinsurgency doctrine suggests that a government needs at least 10 times more troops than the guerrillas it wants to beat. Such large numbers are needed in order to maintain patrols and establish human intelligence networks. They are also needed so that the government use of force will be as discriminating as possible. Otherwise, innocents will die and insurgents will find plenty of embittered civilians to recruit. The Macedonian military has only 16,000 troops. Making matters worse, roughly half are poorly trained nine-month conscripts. A sizable percentage are also ethnic Albanian, and their loyalty to the government in a counterinsurgency campaign would be suspect. Very few of these forces are professionals, proficient in infantry and counterinsurgency operations.