The U.N. peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone has drawn criticism from many commentators. While much of this may be justified, there is a danger of missing the forest for the trees. The specifics of what went wrong and what could have been done better and how are important. However, the more critical point is the structural dilemmas inherent in today's typical peacekeeping missions.
The United Nations was designed to cope with interstate war. Repelling or reversing a clearcut crossborder aggression of one state by another, such as of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, is one of the few bottom lines in international affairs. Yet the disputes clamoring for U.N. attention today are almost all internal. Founded on the principle of national sovereignty, the U.N. is ill-equipped to cope with civil conflict.
Most civil conflicts have deep historical roots and are characterized by broad and mutual suspicions based on past traumatic experiences. U.N. intervention in sectarian strife must accordingly acknowledge the prospect of an indefinite commitment, which is not very attractive to Western governments with professional military forces.