Former Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma discovered to his regret that public discourse in Japan concerning the atomic bombings does not accommodate dissent or nuance. The media credited him with justifying the bombings following his remarks that their use on Hiroshima and Nagasaki could not have been helped. He was suggesting that the bombings hastened the end of the war and prevented a joint occupation with the Soviet Union. It is a fairly common perspective in academic circles, but for a politician representing Nagasaki, this A-bomb gaffe effectively ended his political career.
In "The End of the Pacific War," five scholars from the United States, Japan and Britain argue about the reasons for using the atomic bombs and their impact on Japan's decision to surrender. This remarkable collection of essays exposes readers to a range of views with an engaging repartee among the writers about evidence and competing interpretations. One of the many strengths of this book is the focus on the trilateral- U.S.-Japan-Soviet- nexus of decision-making and the dynamics of the endgame.
Arguments focus on whether Japan would have surrendered in the absence of the atomic bombings and whether the atomic bombs or the Soviet conventional attack had a greater influence on Japan's decision to surrender. There is also disagreement about the Emperor's role and views regarding the war and surrender.