GUATEMALA CITY — Japanese voters have rejected the one-party state under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has supplied most of Japan's government leaders since the party's founding in 1955. (Only in 1993 had an opposition coalition ousted the LDP, for a short time, by holding onto a majority in the Lower House.)

After nearly two decades of poor policy choices that kept the economy in a deflationary funk, the LDP, led by Prime Minister Taro Aso, has been swept from power. As with the election of U.S. President Barack Obama, youthful exuberance overcame a moribund political party full of dinosaurs tone-deaf to demands for change.

The scale of the victory by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) under leader Yukio Hatoyama was impressive — with the DPJ capturing 308 of 480 seats in the Lower House. The LDP now has only 119 seats, down from 300. Unfortunately, the DPJ victory may be simply a case of Tweedledee replacing Tweedledum.

Platform promises and political realities make it likely that substantive changes will be few. For the domestic economy, it may be a matter of jumping out of the fire but into the frying pan.

Indeed, the best hope for real change is in foreign affairs — to the extent that Japan's volte-face emboldens citizens living under autocracy in Burma, China, North Korea or even Singapore to seek democratic change in their own countries.

Still, similarities in the DPJ's and LDP's approach to political governance suggest that changes will be symbolic rather than substantive.

The LDP had overseen an "iron triangle" of political operatives, bureaucrats and big business under a form of Confucian corporatism that exploited consumers. Now, the DPJ promises an "iron rice bowl" of increased welfare spending that requires a different form of coerced redistribution. Either way, certain groups get privileges or benefits at the expense of others.

As with the LDP, higher spending by the DPJ will clobber future taxpayers already burdened with repaying and servicing public-sector debt approaching 200 percent of GDP, despite DPJ's promises to move away from export-led development toward the promotion of consumer interests.

Under LDP rule, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) implemented "window guidance" whereby selected industries received low-interest loans. This meant that other industries had little, if any, access to funds, even as banks offered few consumer services and low interest rates to depositors. Despite successful picks of "winners" among businesses to receive special treatment, there were many more "losers" among the public at large.

Interventions in money markets to weaken the yen led to expensive imports and cheap exports. Imagine running a household by insisting on paying your neighbors more for their products while having them pay you less for yours!

Of course, the DPJ was correct to reject the LDPs export-led, neo- Mercantilism that imitated the 18th century economic doctrine that spawned European imperialism. Its modern incarnation led to high consumer prices and low payoffs on household saving deposits. Then there was the habit of retired bureaucrats going to work for the very corporations that they once regulated, raising questions about conflict of interest.

Another reason to end dependence on exports as the basis of economic growth is that the apparent success with this model was a combination of happenstance and circumstance. In the first place, Japan's ability to export was based upon its privileged access to uncontested markets in mature economies of North America and Western Europe.

This openness reflected realities of the Cold War in which Japan's economic strength, as an offset to China, served the strategic interests of Western powers. Initially, Japan's export volume was small and of low quality so that there was little domestic opposition from trade unions and producers in receiving countries. This changed. Now many countries have entered the fray in fierce competition, often with the same type of goods offered by Japan's producers. With the pace of technological or regulatory change quickening, comparative advantage can disappear in the blink of an eye.

Unfortunately, the DPJ does not seem to have a vision of how to sort out Japan's position in the world of meta-competition. Instead of seeking to remove rigidities in the domestic economy, the DPJ promises to boost domestic demand with a stronger social safety net and employment provisions. Pushing businesses to raise wages and hire fewer temporary workers will lead to lower profits, stifling much-needed investment.

Furthermore, promises of more child subsidies, free secondary schools and guaranteed minimum pensions have been made without clear explanations of how to pay for them. Fulfilling all or any of these promises will raise government spending and add to the massive public-sector debt, the highest proportion of any industrialized country.

Even the DPJ's most encouraging platform plank promises with one hand and takes away with the other. The promise to "promote" a free-trade agreement with the United States was tempered by the fear of losing votes of domestic farmers. In turn, the party has promised to ensure food safety, promote domestic farming and boost food self-sufficiency. But if these are used as excuses to block trade in agriculture, food prices will rise unnecessarily and harm consumers.

On balance, DPJ policy preferences are unlikely to promote the sort of human and physical capital accumulation needed for vibrant economic growth. As such, the most likely outcome of the dramatic electoral upheaval in Japan is an economy that will remain in the doldrums for many more years to come.

Christopher Lingle is a research scholar at the Center for Civil Society in New Delhi and Visiting Professor of Economics at the Universidad Francisco Marroquin in Guatemala.