The result of this week’s U.S. presidential election could have a vastly different impact on Japan depending on who wins, with Republican Donald Trump offering up the prospect of disruption and Democrat Kamala Harris likely to maintain the status quo.
But, contrary to what some observers fear, Washington’s limited bandwidth as it grapples with two wars — Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s war against Hamas and Hezbollah — means that any drastic shift in the trajectory of U.S.-Japan ties is unlikely, at least in the immediate future.
Japan is also more prepared to prevent a shock similar to 2016 following Trump’s unexpected electoral victory. Whoever wins the race to succeed President Joe Biden, Tokyo — which has already sent emissaries to both camps — will continue to work assiduously to craft a strong relationship with the incoming U.S. administration.
Nevertheless, a new American president inevitably means a recalibration in how Tokyo deals with the U.S. Here’s a look at the issues the alliance faces, and how each of the candidates might approach them if victorious.
More of the same?
Under Biden, both countries have claimed that their alliance has grown "stronger than ever,” while Tokyo has thrown away many of the postwar taboos on building up its defense architecture. This has included a five-year plan through fiscal 2027 to spend about ¥43 trillion ($281 billion) on defense as Tokyo looks to boost related spending to 2% of gross domestic product.
Indeed, just this year, the allies heralded a “new era” for the alliance, complete with a historic upgrade of defense ties as they look to beef up Japan’s role in countering China’s growing assertiveness.
Beijing’s military moves near Japan — including incursions into Japanese airspace and territorial waters and its large-scale exercises around Taiwan — have been a key driver of the push for a more robust alliance. China, viewed by the U.S. as a strategic competitor and by Japan as its top security concern, is also one issue that both candidates come close to agreeing on.
Considering the widespread bipartisan support in the U.S. for taking a tougher line on China, more of the same can reasonably be expected, including Tokyo’s position as Washington's top partner in confronting Beijing.
“Japan's role in the U.S. strategy toward China will likely stay the same, regardless of a change in administration,” said Ryo Sahashi, an expert on international politics in East Asia and associate professor at the University of Tokyo. “After all, no partner in Asia can replace Japan.”
On the economic front, however, Japan has at times found itself at odds with the United States.
Tokyo has chafed at pressure from Washington to follow its lead in slapping Beijing with onerous curbs on chipmakers, though it has reluctantly — and quietly — signed on to many of these measures.
Perhaps more crucially, Japan has been left disappointed by the glaring omission of a strong U.S.-led economic component to Washington’s improved relationship with Tokyo and its growing focus on the Indo-Pacific region.
While Japan has held out hope that the U.S. might eventually rejoin the overhauled Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), both a Harris or a second Trump administration are unlikely to return Washington to the wide-ranging trade pact, considering the current political climate in the U.S. and skepticism over free-trade deals.
Trump 2.0
Tokyo will find itself in an unenviable situation if Trump wins.
Not only did Japan lose its most effective “Trump whisperer” with the assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2022, it is also grappling with domestic political turmoil after Japanese voters punished the ruling bloc at the polls on Oct. 27.
In that election, the ruling coalition lost its majority in the Lower House of parliament for the first time in 15 years, and Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has been preoccupied with securing support for his government ahead of Nov. 11, when a special session of parliament convenes to pick the country’s leader.
But even if a more stable government is formed, a Trump win would ensure that the prime minister would have to keep one eye focused on who takes up key White House posts.
Former senior Japanese officials say that, while their counterparts in the first Trump administration had a lot of experience and Tokyo was able to work with them to maintain a stable strategic and diplomatic relationship, much will depend on the president’s next team.
The lion’s share of experienced officials from Trump’s first stint have in the years since distanced themselves or even disavowed their ties to the former president, though some remain close to him, including Sen. Bill Hagerty, who served as ambassador to Japan under Trump and is seen as a front-runner for a top Cabinet post.
It’s unclear what kind of dynamic such an administration may bring to the U.S.-Japan alliance, though critics have said a cadre of “yes-men” in Washington could see Trump’s more destructive impulses unleashed on Japan and the Indo-Pacific region.
This could include a return to his more transactional approach to the alliance, where he might again demand that Japan cough up more cash for hosting American troops or risk their withdrawal.
Such a scenario, however, could potentially be offset by Japan emphasizing its focus on beefing up its own defenses — while also appealing to Trump by giving him credit for planting the seeds that led to this shift.
But Ishiba and the ruling bloc’s electoral woes could spell trouble for Tokyo, especially if this jeopardizes the government’s planned defense push.
“Japan appears to be returning to a period of political uncertainty, and this will complicate the implementation of Japan’s current defense ambitions and spending,” said Patrick Cronin, an Asia-Pacific security expert with the Hudson Institute think tank. “Trump will not hesitate to make cost-sharing an issue if Tokyo’s promised defense increases fail to materialize.”
Ultimately, Tokyo would need to be able to think innovatively as a rules-shaper, pursue proactive diplomacy and showcase its ability to be a willing and capable partner for the U.S. in the event of a Trump victory.
“These approaches are all key to navigating the international environment under Trump 2.0,” a trio of experts wrote in a recent analysis published by the Asia Society think tank.
Harris takes the reins
How a Harris White House would shake out remains a question mark for Japan, though her election would likely be less unnerving for Tokyo since she has signaled continuity with Biden on the importance of the two countries’ alliance.
During a lunch with then-Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in Washington last April, the vice president echoed Biden when she called the alliance “a source of great strength for the United States militarily, economically, and culturally.”
“It is a force for good in the world,” she said.
Those remarks were seen as a tacit sign that she would stick with the Biden administration’s strategy of “integrated deterrence,” a still-vague concept under which the U.S. employs all tools of national power across domains, geography and spectrum of conflict, while working with allies and partners to deter enemies.
Still, despite serving nearly four years as a U.S. senator and almost four more as Biden’s vice president, her relatively limited experience in the foreign policy arena could be a concern.
Out of the gates, challenges on this front would abound for a Harris administration.
It would likely have to contend with growing Chinese regional assertiveness, an attention-seeking North Korea, the grinding war in Ukraine and an expanding conflict in the Middle East.
How she would handle these challenges as president — while simultaneously managing the increasingly important U.S.-Japan alliance — would likely hinge on the team she decides to surround herself with.
Harris is expected to bring aboard her closest advisers and tap people she personally trusts as key Cabinet members, but there would also likely be some continuity with the Biden administration.
In a look at who might make up such a Cabinet, Politico reported last month, citing sources close to discussions, that current U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel was one of the top contenders to be Harris' U.S. trade representative.
An appointment of Emanuel, a former White House chief of staff under President Barack Obama, would put an outspoken supporter of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the Cabinet. At the same time, it would signal an openness by Harris to the free-trading approach of Emanuel’s former boss — a move that would be welcomed in Tokyo.
Most observers, however, do not see Harris deviating significantly from the Biden administration’s economic policies, which mirrored the first Trump administration and eschewed the championing of free trade.
“There is almost a sort of a bipartisan consensus that trade liberalization is out and managed trade is in,” Satoru Mori, an expert on U.S.-Japan relations and a professor at Keio University, said during a recent press briefing.
This means that a Harris administration would have little “political incentive” to pursue trade liberalization, he said, “because that is understood in Washington, at least, to be detrimental to the U.S. middle class and U.S. workers.”
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