Ukraine is far from doomed

After a monthslong delay, the fractious United States House of Representatives finally approved more than $60 billion in military aid for Ukraine last week — and not a moment too soon.

Two years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, there is mounting pessimism about Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. The Ukrainian counteroffensive last summer failed to achieve its stated objectives after repeated delays in the delivery of Western weapons, while Russia ramped up its own military production and made limited territorial gains. As a result, a growing chorus of voices is asking whether it’s time for Ukraine and its allies to rethink their aims and consider a negotiated settlement.

Europe has been here before. The same question was being asked in 1941, two years after Nazi Germany began its own imperialist conquest by invading Poland. Among the prominent figures arguing against U.S. entry into World War II was Charles Lindbergh, who argued that there was no chance of success and that it would be best for the European war to “end without conclusive victory.”

But while this sounds eerily similar to the increasingly defeatist narrative about Ukraine’s prospects, there is one key difference: The situation in 1941 was far grimmer. By the end of that year, Nazi Germany occupied France, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands and much of Eastern Europe, and had expanded its reach by invading the Soviet Union that June. The Axis powers — Germany, Italy and Japan — seemed unstoppable.

The first two years of WWII also had a devastating impact on civilian populations. The heavy bombing of cities killed thousands and caused significant economic damage. Jews from all over Europe were being herded into ghettos and deported to concentration camps. Exploitation, violent repression and genocide cast a dark shadow over much of the territory under German control.

Nazi Germany drew strength from the physical resources and human capital of its occupied territories. By 1941, 37% of France’s gross domestic product was being channeled, in the form of occupation payments, to the German war machine. After the Nazis abrogated the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact that June, the Soviet Union lost half of its industrial capacity and some of its best farmland.

This brutal system of exploitation contrasts sharply with Russia’s failed attempts to control Ukrainian resources. For example, Ukraine’s “humanitarian corridor” has succeeded in breaking the Russian naval blockade of its Black Sea ports. As a result, the country exported more grain in December than the maximum monthly volume under the United Nations-brokered deal with Russia.

Moreover, Ukraine’s mobilization efforts over the past two years, while substantial, have been far milder than those of the United Kingdom during WWII. In September 1939, the U.K. instituted full conscription of men between the ages of 18 and 41. By late 1941, different forms of conscription also applied to unmarried women aged 20-30 and men up to age 60, with military service for men up to 51. Former British colonies that were part of the Commonwealth — including Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa — also contributed troops to the Allied war effort, even though they were not under direct attack.

As for mobilizing material resources, the European Union has struggled to supply Ukraine with the 1 million artillery shells that it promised. By contrast, two years into WWII, the U.K. had spent 53% of its national income on the war effort, while the U.S. had instituted its historic lend-lease program and, more importantly, was reorienting its full industrial potential to defense production. This full-throttle support was central to turning the tide of the war, allowing the Allies to liberate Europe from the grip of tyranny and pave the way for a new era of peace and cooperation on the continent.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ambitions seem more clearly doomed than those of Adolf Hitler in 1941. Russia’s military failed in its original attack on Kyiv, was pushed back from Kharkiv and Kherson and has not made any large breakthroughs, despite casualties numbering in the hundreds of thousands and the destruction of nearly one-third of its naval fleet. And its crony-capitalist economy, rife with corruption and nepotism, is meager compared to the combined economic might of Ukraine’s allies, with a GDP equal to that of Texas.

Compared to the beaten-down Europe of 1941, today’s EU is much more capable of resisting Russian aggression. But victory is never a given — it requires the West, and the U.S. in particular, to put aside domestic political squabbles and muster the political will to provide Ukraine with consistent and robust military and financial assistance.

Any further funding delays threaten to leave the country dangerously exposed. The EU, for its part, must mobilize economic resources for enhanced defense production. The sacrifices needed now pale in comparison to those made in WWII, but the dividend of lasting peace will be no less valuable.

Two years into WWII, Nazi Germany occupied 33% of the European continent and the other Axis powers terrorized much of the rest of the world. And yet the Allies, united in their determination to prevail and their willingness to mobilize resources, refused to give up. At the same point in its imperialist aggression, Russia holds only 18% of Ukraine’s territory and has made almost no gains in over a year. If Russia proves too difficult to defeat, the reason will not be a lack of resources, but rather a glaring lack of leadership.