Beware the steady creep toward crisis in the South China Sea

While attention has been focused on rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the real tinderbox in Southeast Asia is Second Thomas Shoal, a spit of sand and coral claimed by both the Philippines and China.

The two countries’ maritime forces — a broad term that here includes gray-hull navy vessels, white-hull coast guards and militias — are engaged in increasingly dangerous confrontations that not only threaten direct conflict but could also ensnare the United States and Japan. That is no reason to back down, but we must be clear eyed about the stakes and the potential consequences.

The Philippine government claims Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin to the Philippines or Ren’ai Jiao for the Chinese), some 200 kilometers from its country’s coast, as part of its continental shelf. China counters that its use of the entire South China Sea — and thus its sovereignty over the water and the islands within it — goes back two millennia and the Beijing government has codified that claim in maps since 1947 and laws dating from 1958.

In a 2016 ruling, the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea backed Manila’s claims while sidestepping the question of actual sovereignty. Beijing has dismissed and ignored the decision.

In a new analysis, researchers at CNAS, the Washington think tank, explained why: “Projecting power and dominating the South China Sea, with its critical resources and central role in global trade — around $3 trillion worth of commerce transits the seaways annually — is a top national security and foreign policy goal for China.” They cite the U.S. Department of Defense's annual report on China, which details “multiple coercive actions” in the South China Sea that “appear to have been ... a centralized, concerted campaign ... to coerce a change in lawful U.S. operational activity and that of U.S. allies and partners.”

The two governments have sparred over the island for over two decades. To solidify its claim, in 1999 the Philippines intentionally grounded a World War II-vintage vessel, the BRP Sierra Madre, on the shoal and permanently stationed a small garrison of marines — about a dozen men — on the ship.

For 15 years, the Philippines conducted regular resupply missions without interference. That changed in March 2014, when Chinese Coast Guard vessels harassed and blocked supply boats during one trip. Supplies were eventually air dropped and Beijing backed off until November 2021, when its coast guard used water cannons for the first time against Filipino boats, a tactic that has since become increasingly common. Other forms of escalation followed.

In February 2023, the Chinese Coast Guard trained a military-grade laser on a Philippine resupply ship; it temporarily blinded the crew and forced cancellation of the mission. In March, the use of a water cannon injured four Philippine sailors, the first time anyone was hurt in the skirmishes. Earlier in the day, a “dangerous blocking maneuver” resulted in a collision and slight damage to the Philippine boat. Later last month, a Chinese military helicopter buzzed Philippine scientists working on another island in the area. The Chinese Navy held recent live-fire drills targeting “armed enemy fishing boats” to signal Manila of its combat capabilities.

Jeffrey Ordaniel, a professor at Tokyo International University who focuses on Southeast Asia maritime issues (and a colleague of mine at Pacific Forum), warned that “China is testing the waters. Absent any meaningful response from the Philippines and its allies and partners, Beijing will simply continue to push the envelope and gradually change the status quo.”

The Philippines is pushing back. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has adopted a policy of “assertive transparency” to show the world what China is doing. It has invited journalists on resupply missions to get a firsthand look at Chinese tactics and the resulting videos, readily available on YouTube and other social media sites, have been graphic.

In a social media post last week, Marcos said that the Philippines would respond against “illegal, coercive, aggressive and dangerous attacks" from Chinese vessels in the South China Sea. He signed Executive Order No. 57, which called for “strengthening the country's maritime security and domain awareness.” He didn’t identify what his government would specifically do but pledged that actions would be proportionate, deliberate and reasonable.

China wasn’t impressed. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said that “China asks the Philippines to immediately stop infringing on China’s sovereignty and rights and stop making provocations,” adding that his government “will take resolute measures to safeguard our territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.” A Defense Ministry spokesperson was more shrill, denouncing “the Philippine side's treachery and provocation, as well as its fabrication of lies to mislead international public opinion.”

Key to Marcos’s strategy is working more closely with other governments. First on his list is the United States, the Philippines’ treaty ally. Last year, the Manila government agreed to expand U.S. access to bases in the country in the event of a contingency — widely considered shorthand for a conflict over Taiwan, but not just that — and expanded the scope of joint-military exercises that the two countries conduct.

The U.S. has repeatedly and publicly reaffirmed its commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines. Last week Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin reiterated “the ironclad U.S. commitment to the Philippines,” reminding any aggressor that it risks a U.S. response in the event of a conflict. In Congressional testimony last week, Indo-Pacific Command head, Adm. John Aquilino, said that Manila could invoke the treaty if a sailor or a member of its military is killed in a confrontation with China.

Manila is expanding and consolidating ties with a host of other nations, of which Japan may be the most important. Tokyo has been one of the largest sources of aid for infrastructure along with other economic projects. It has provided 12 vessels for the Philippine Coast Guard and during a November 2023 visit to Manila, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced a $525 million loan to build five more patrol boats. He also agreed to provide a coastal radar surveillance system. The two nations have begun negotiations on a reciprocal troop access agreement that will permit closer military coordination and training.

Perhaps the most interesting and important development is burgeoning trilateral ties between Japan, the U.S. and the Philippines. Long mooted, they materialized last summer when their three coast guards held a joint drill in Manila Bay. Days later, the three national security advisors met in Tokyo to discuss and coordinate security strategies to boost deterrence against potential Chinese revisionism in the region.

Those efforts will get a boost next week, when Marcos joins U.S. President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Kishida in Washington for the first trilateral summit between leaders of the three countries. Some in the media are reporting that they will announce the first trilateral naval patrols in the South China Sea, which will take place later this year. The U.S. said that the summit is expected to produce a vision of “a trilateral partnership” based on “deep historical ties, friendship, robust and growing economic relations, a proud and resolute commitment to shared democratic values and a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific.”

This is good, but Tokyo International University's Ordaniel worries that it isn’t enough. “China is acting with impunity,” he said in an email, and “it’s time for the Philippines and the U.S. to discuss imposing actual costs on China.” He added that “more statements that condemn Chinese behavior at sea or mere rhetorical expressions of support for the Philippines will have very negligible impact.”

He is concerned about over-reliance on exercises. They are good, he explained, but “military exercises did not stop China from seizing Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal. They did nothing to stop the PRC's land reclamation and militarization. They will do nothing to stop China's interference in Second Thomas Shoal.”

The planned trilateral naval exercise is not enough, especially if conducted somewhere else. “It does nothing to address actual PRC coercion.” He wants to see actual contingency planning and “a real division of labor between the U.S. and Japan in assisting the Philippines play a greater role in regional security.”

Ordaniel and the CNAS researchers also call for regular U.S. Navy escorts for Philippine vessels, whether for resupply trips or other missions. “That will show China that its bad behavior at sea is resulting in more U.S. military presence in the region, not less,” explained Ordaniel.

This would certainly increase the stakes although China won’t accept that causal sequence. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin made that case Monday, telling reporters that “the Philippines, backed by external forces, has been going back on its words and making provocations. This is the real cause of the current tensions at sea.”

With two governments holding firm positions and a steady escalation in pressure — accompanied by a gradual increase in players — the stakes are getting higher. This is the real South China Sea crisis.