Last week, officials from the highest levels of the Japanese and U.S. governments met in Washington.

On Jan. 11, the two governments held a "two-plus-two” defense and foreign ministerial meeting and two days later came the summit between Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and President Joe Biden.

Sprinkled throughout the multiday visit were other political and social engagements, all centered on promoting Japan’s role in tackling global issues and advancing myriad Japan-U.S. initiatives. With so much activity going on during the trip, one may reasonably wonder what to make of it all. Was there any substance to it? What were the key outcomes? What does this mean moving forward?

To understand the meaning of what took place last week, the first thing to recognize is the robustness of it all. Although most media outlets focused on the security angle of the engagements, the itinerary for the Japanese delegation went well beyond discussions on counterstrike capabilities or how America views Japan’s three new security documents.

There was a vice-ministerial level meeting of the Economic Policy Consultative Committee, the signing of a new agreement on space cooperation at NASA headquarters, a key policy speech from Kishida at Johns Hopkins University, among several other notable engagements.

The broad scope of these meetings itself demonstrates how far the alliance has gone beyond defense to encompass institutionalized cooperation in other areas. There will always be some friction in the bilateral relationship — that is an inescapable truth in international relations — but it is incredible just how far the two countries have come in developing a dynamic, durable and meaningful relationship.

With that key point in mind, the two most senior-level engagements were the meeting of the Security Consultative Committee and the bilateral summit.

The Security Consultative Committee, or SCC, is the highest forum for alliance management short of a meeting between the two countries’ leaders themselves. Over the years, the level at which the SCC took place has evolved and it now happens at the ministerial two-plus-two level. The purpose of the committee is to provide the strategic and policy direction for lower level alliance managers.

Meanwhile, the Kishida-Biden summit, although short on deliverables, was a politically significant one for the prime minister. Although Kishida has engaged Biden on the sidelines of other meetings, this was his first one-on-one summit since taking office in October 2021 and it gave the two leaders an opportunity to affirm the actions taking place at lower levels of government.

From these meetings, there were five takeaways worth noting.

The first takeaway is a technical one, but notable because of how it could affect other alliance relationships with like-minded countries. The Security Consultative Committee clarified that the scope of Article V — the defense obligation clause of the Japan-U.S. alliance treaty — includes attacks from space.

Since the signing of the treaty in 1960, there was consensus that an attack in the land, air, or maritime domains could be recognized as triggering Article V. But the emergence of cyber and space threats led to discussions on whether those obligations extend to those new domains. In 2019, the allies affirmed that Article V applies to cyberattacks, and in this most recent meeting, they added attacks from space as applicable under the Mutual Security Treaty.

This follows the NATO position articulated in 2021 and could serve as a model for other bilateral defense relationships as their policymakers consider how to approach these security domains.

Second, the Japanese government has demonstrated its willingness to tackle “NIMBY” restraints. The “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) syndrome has affected the ability of both U.S. and Japanese forces to train in Japan and advance various alliance initiatives.

In particular, it has created obstacles to the deployment of new U.S. capabilities to Japan, slowed implementation of force realignment initiatives in Okinawa, inhibited low altitude training for both U.S. and Japanese MV-22 Ospreys and restricted “Field Carrier Landing Practice” (land-based practice for aircrews who deploy on carriers) activities at airfields on the home islands.

The allies demonstrated progress in all those areas. They lauded the recent deployment of an American unmanned aircraft unit to an Air Self Defense Force Base in Kagoshima, affirmed the commitment to advance U.S. Marine Corps realignment designs, called for low altitude Osprey training and pledged to complete the new carrier landing practice facility on Mageshima, Kagoshima Prefecture. Officials also affirmed that they would pursue allied training activities at civilian airports and seaports, which would be firsts for the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Third, the two governments pushed forward cooperation in defense research and development. Japan was the first country to participate in joint and cooperative development of a ballistic missile interceptor with the United States, and officials last week affirmed that the U.S. and Japan would step up similar activities, particularly in the field of hypersonic weapon systems and interceptors.

This aligns with Japan’s intent to revamp its domestic defense industry, as the Kishida administration hopes to leverage cooperative development and production as a bridge to a self-sustaining defense industrial sector in Japan.

Fourth, Japan affirmed its intention to demonstrate a more active role in global security. As the joint statement between Kishida and Biden acknowledged, the "challenges we face transcend geography,” compelling Japan to accept responsibility for what happens beyond the region.

While the near-term issue remains Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Japan is looking to use its nonpermanent seat in the U.N. Security Council and Group of Seven presidency to institutionalize Japan’s role as a defender of the rules-based international order across the globe. This is uncharted territory for Japan, so cooperation with its U.S. ally will be key as the government determines what gaps exist and how Japan may be able to fill them.

The last key takeaway comes from the absence of something from these meetings: There was no decision to renegotiate the guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.

The defense guidelines is an agreed-upon document that codifies bilaterally recognized roles, missions and capabilities for the alliance. The Japanese government has shown interest in renegotiating the 2015 version of the defense guidelines based on the evolving security environment, but the allies opted not to reopen the yearslong negotiation process at this time.

The decision not to renegotiate the guidelines should serve as a clear indicator of the evolutionary rather than revolutionary nature of Japan’s new security documents. That is, the fact that the 2015 defense guidelines are sufficient for accommodating Japan’s updated policy designs illustrates that there are no fundamental changes to Japan’s security practice, just modifications that have been topics of discussion for over a decade.

The fact that the allies do not require continuous renegotiation of their standing agreements is an important one. It demonstrates the quality work that government officials have done to lay the groundwork for cooperation — something that was well-illustrated last week. The allies continue to build upon that solid foundation in ways that ensure that the Japan-U.S. alliance is not just an end unto itself, but a mechanism for tackling global issues.

Michael MacArthur Bosack is the special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served in the Japanese government as a Mansfield fellow.