Pyeongtaek, South Korea –

Japan and the Philippines held a “two-plus-two” foreign and defense ministerial meeting for the first time ever last weekend.

The Philippines is the ninth country with which Japan has held a meeting of this format, and only the second Southeast Asian nation.

But what does that mean in practice? After all, the Japanese government has also held a two-plus-two with Russia, and the previous Southeast Asian government to meet in this format was Indonesia — not exactly major security partners for Japan.

So, was this recent event with Japan and the Philippines nothing more than a high-level photo opportunity? Was there substance, and what does it portend for the two countries going forward?

On the surface, it is easy to argue that the meeting was significant simply because it demonstrates yet another partnership evolving to counterbalance China. It is no secret that Tokyo has concerns over China’s challenge to the Japanese-administered areas in the East China Sea. Meanwhile, the Philippines has similar worries over China’s island-building and unilateral imposition of the so-called Nine-dash line boundary in the South China Sea.

Those issues, while important, are only two elements of a more complex and deeply rooted relationship. The two-plus-two meeting was really a reflection of partners that are Asian democracies with common values, have a mutual ally in the form of the United States, maintain strong economic and grassroots connections and recognize the necessity of a rules-based international order.

Thus, to understand fully what this meeting meant for the security relationship, some historical perspective is in order.

Following World War II, Japan and the Philippines were not what one might consider likely friends. Imperial Japan executed a war of aggression against the Philippines and the infamous Bataan Death March offers just a glimpse of the country’s human rights record as an occupation force.

Nevertheless, just five years after the end of World War II, Japan and the Philippines would be thrust together in security cooperation — albeit indirectly. When North Korea invaded the South, the United Nations Security Council called on the international community to restore peace on the Korean peninsula and the Philippines answered the call. Meanwhile, Japan became a rear-area support base for that multinational effort that included the Philippines.

But that was indirect cooperation. Direct cooperation came later with the normalization of ties. when the Japan-Philippines Reparations Agreement entered into force in 1956. In the decades following, renewed ties steadily expanded, especially in the diplomatic and economic realms. For one, the Philippines has been a prime recipient of Official Development Assistance, or “ODA,” where Japan has delivered both grants and loans to the country.

But it was not until the early 2000s that the security aspect of the relationship began to burgeon, when the two countries initiated the so-called Political and Security Consultation. where officials could discuss the strategic environment and reaffirm common interests.

The next evolution came in 2010 with the advent of the Benigno Aquino presidency. A core feature of Aquino’s security platform was improving ties with Japan, which manifested in 2011 with the countries’ so-called Strategic Partnership.

The security relationship saw nontraditional cooperation in November 2013 when Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines. The disaster killed over 6000 people, caused billions of dollars in damage to infrastructure and left hundreds of thousands homeless.

Japan dispatched dozens of Ground Self-Defense Force members, six helicopters and a medical team, with two Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels in support. This boots on the ground moment was a milestone event in the history of the relationship and one that buttressed the foundation for bolstered ties.

The trend towards more formalized cooperation came as then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made it a priority to expand security ties with non-U.S. partners including Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom and, of course, the Philippines.

During a state visit to Japan in late spring 2015, Abe and Aquino discussed a potential Visiting Forces Agreement that would define the rights, duties and obligations for the Japan Self-Defense Force to operate on Filipino soil. The two governments followed up that discussion with the conclusion of an agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology.

But then a sea change happened in 2016: The Aquino administration ended and Rodrigo Duterte took office as the president of the Philippines.

Duterte brought a different mindset towards the presence of foreign forces in the Philippines and how his country should approach the conventional raison d’etre for expanded security ties with Japan; that is, China.

But it did not take too long for the Duterte administration to start coming back around to Japan.

By 2018, around 100 Ground Self-Defense Force troops were invited to participate in Exercise Kamandag along with more than 1000 U.S. and Filipino soldiers. As of November 2021, there have been four iterations of that training event. In July 2021, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force took part in its first bilateral air-to-air training with the Philippines Air Force, focusing on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

With increasing levels of uniformed cooperation, the question then was how to elevate political-level consultations and move towards more traditional security cooperation. In November 2021, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida held a telephone summit with Duterte, and the two sides announced that they would launch the full-blown ministerial level consultation via the two-plus-two mechanism.

That brings us to the event last weekend–the first-ever two-plus-two–and the four key takeaways from the engagement.

The first is that Japan and the Philippines formally elevated their intergovernmental consultation. More than simply signaling greater commitment, it institutionalized opportunities for senior leaders to meet regularly and provide direction in implementing policies related to security cooperation. This is a big step for establishing a policy architecture necessary for evolving bilateral ties.

Second, while they each gave nods to their respective unilateral interests, it was the rules-based international order that was front and center.

The Philippines cited the South China Sea, Sulu-Celebes Seas and Mindanao issues, while Japan raised the East China Sea and North Korean abduction issues. However, they also mentioned Russia’s war against Ukraine, the military coup in Myanmar and nuclear nonproliferation, among other things. Ultimately, the two sides tacitly acknowledged that the means for achieving their respective unilateral interests must include cooperation in reinforcing the rules-based international order together.

Third, the two-plus-two signaled two important deliverables: the governments agreed to work toward both a Reciprocal Access Agreement and an Acquisitions Cross-Servicing Agreement. In plain terms, the former deals with provisions for partner forces operating from each other's territories, and the latter covers mutual logistics support.

This means that Japan is taking advantage of the fait accompli achieved through its partnerships with Australia, with whom Japan has both a RAA and an ACSA. A key principle in Japanese security practice is that the first time Japan does something in the realm of security is politically challenging, but it becomes far easier after that, and now we see Japan seeking those same types of agreements with the Philippines. Both constitute notable instruments for advancing security ties and are meaningful goals for the partners to work towards.

The final takeaway is that there is much work left to be done. The two countries have created the mechanisms and charted their course, but now they have to travel the path together. With the upcoming presidential election in the Philippines, the question will naturally be how the next administration feels about the roadmap that has been drawn.

We do not know the answer to that, but we do know that the two governments have prepared themselves well to adapt to the democratic transition and continue evolving their relationship as stronger and more closely-bonded security partners.

Michael MacArthur Bosack is the special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served in the Japanese government as a Mansfield fellow.