HAIKOU, CHINA –

Many meetings on the South China Sea are presented with a plethora of proposals for multilateral security cooperation. Few, however, have ever been implemented, and of those that have, even fewer have been effective, in that the security of all participating countries is better than what it would have been without the cooperation. We should accept this reality and examine why this is so.

The 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) was supposed to "enhance favorable conditions for a peaceful and durable solution of differences and disputes among countries concerned." It has failed to do so. Specifically, claimants were supposed to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability. . . ." They did not do so. The agreement was supposed to be a precursor and foundation for a binding robust Code of Conduct for the South China Sea (COC). This has not happened and a COC appears dead in the water.

In 2005, the U.S. chief of naval operations, Adm. Michael Mullen, proposed a multinational "thousand ship" navy under U.S. tactical command to provide maritime security in the 21st century. It has not been realized. In 2004, the United States proposed a Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) with an initial focus on situational awareness and information sharing in the Malacca Strait. This proposal was — to put it politely — ignored by Indonesia and Malaysia, and faded away.

Undaunted the U.S. has this year announced a $425 million Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative as part of the U.S. rebalance to Asia and its vision of a stronger regional security architecture in which it presumably wants to play a major role. This proposal may suffer the same fate as the RMSI. Most Southeast Asian nations will be happy to accept capacity building but may be unwilling to sign on to any regional scheme that could be taken as "siding" with the U.S. against China or as endorsing a security role for external military forces.

Throughout the 1990s, Japan sought to organize regional initiatives to combat piracy in Southeast Asia. One proposal was for Ocean Peace Keeping, which envisioned a standing maritime force of naval contingents from regional states. In 1999, then-Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi proposed a regional coast guard for Southeast Asia. These proposals were publicly opposed by China and received a noncommittal reception from Southeast Asian states.

In November 2011, China announced a $500 million China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund intended to implement the cooperative measures specified in the DOC and also support the development of infrastructure along the Maritime Silk Road. Because proposals must come from governments to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, some Southeast Asian countries are leery that doing so for projects in the South China Sea might be construed as recognition of China's claims there.

In May this year, Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou announced a South China Sea Peace Initiative that calls for shelving the disputes and negotiating resource-sharing agreements. The response from Beijing and ASEAN claimants has been less than enthusiastic. Beijing may be concerned that Taiwan will soften its stance on its nearly identical claims thus undermining Beijing's claims. The fact that Taiwan is not recognized as a nation by China, Asia and the U.S. is a significant diplomatic political obstacle to its implementation.

The Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking was an agreement between China, Vietnam and the Philippines to explore defined areas in the South China Sea. Analysts initially had high hopes that it would be a successful multilateral venture circumventing the maritime conflicts. But it was not to be. The agreement was criticized as undermining ASEAN claimants' claims and ASEAN unity, as well as the juridical position of the Philippines. Moreover, it was alleged to be a violation of the constitution of the Philippines and tied to corruption in the leadership. It was not renewed. Not only did this agreement not build trust and confidence between the claimants, it arguably decreased it, and the security of the Philippines.

There are both conceptual and practical obstacles to such cooperation and regime building.

Most Asian countries have obtained independence since World War II and suffered through bitter internal and international struggles to do so. They jealously guard their sovereignty and any perceived undermining thereof. Most have only recently extended their maritime jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles or more and tend to view the areas gained — especially islands and their attendant waters — as part of their national heritage. This perspective overwhelms proposals for "shared security" management and UNCLOS provisions encouraging maritime cooperation.

Many national frontiers are now maritime and boundary disputes have become symbols of national pride and legitimacy. Considering the tenuous or even hostile relations between many of the states in the region and the likelihood of petroleum in disputed EEZ and continental shelf areas, maritime issues are treated with extreme caution. This makes the "leap of faith" required for security cooperation and regime building particularly hazardous and difficult.

Whether it is modernization or an arms race, there is undeniably an increasing effort being made by Asian countries to protect the resources and rights in their extended maritime jurisdictional zones. As a result, encounters between naval assets are increasing. This together with the myriad island sovereignty and jurisdictional disputes reinforces the bias against maritime security cooperation.

The scales of territory, population, military capacity and economy among Asian countries are quite asymmetric. Given limited resources and capabilities, many countries do not have the luxury to commit to cooperation to meet threats that are low priority to them — like piracy, trade in weapons of mass destruction, noncommercial freedom of navigation concerns, and maritime domain awareness that are in the greater interest of maritime powers. Most countries in the region are still "developing" and are unwilling or unable to think and act long-term at the perceived expense of short-term interests.

The region has now come under the influence of the China-U.S. rivalry. As Singapore's Foreign Minister K. Shanmugam has said, "I'm not sure if we have the luxury of space as we had in the past. . . ." "Major powers . . . will soon be talking to us in terms of 'either you're with us or against.' " Maritime security cooperation with one is often seen as taking a stand against the other. This is reinforced by China and the U.S. themselves — sometimes publicly and often behind the scenes.

Moreover, many Asian nations harbor deep, historically based suspicions of each other, making security cooperation all the more difficult. Then there is the perennial problem of involving China and Taiwan in a multilateral marine policy regime covering areas claimed by both. Also, most big powers prefer to avoid multilateral regimes in which the smaller nations can form blocs against them.

As Lord Palmerstone and Henry Kissinger believed and practiced, "there are no permanent friends or enemies — only permanent interests." All countries' decisions are influenced to some degree by the thinking behind this dictum. Maritime security cooperation favors the more powerful who can display the superiority of their technology, assets and weapons and thus tacitly intimidate their potential opponents while observing and detecting the latter's weaknesses.

Practical obstacles to cooperation include tight operating budgets; lack of common doctrine, language and interoperability of equipment; and widely varying stages of technological development. Intelligence information sharing is particularly sensitive because it involves sources and methods as well.

It now seems obvious that Asian multilateral maritime security regimes can be fully successful only if there is a common high priority threat perception, and both China and the U.S. are willing and able to encourage Asian participation against this threat. Even then the smaller countries must first become more equal in capacity and capability, and their strident nationalism and suspicions regarding transparency and sharing of information must have been mitigated. This will take time and effort. The diplomatic hospitals and graveyards are littered with proposals and efforts that did not take this reality into account.

Idealists have faith that cooperation and regime building in nontraditional security sectors will build trust and confidence and spill over into cooperation on "hard" security issues. This has seldom if ever been demonstrably the case in Asia. Here, multilateral maritime security regimes are not robust, fully formed or fully effective. All can be greatly improved. But what exists is a start — a shaky foundation — that hopefully can be firmed up and built upon.

Mark J. Valencia is an adjunct senior scholar at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies in Haikou, China.