HONOLULU -- "Our firm stance toward North Korea is working!" So goes the conventional wisdom in Washington these days, as supporters of President George W. Bush's "hardline" policy claim credit for Pyongyang's recent decision to resume its dialogue with Seoul.

"Not so fast," say supporters of South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy. It was Seoul's persistent, evenhanded (and openhearted) approach toward the North that persuaded Pyongyang to come around, despite (rather than because of) Bush's confrontational policies.

My guess -- and, when it comes to divining North Korean motives, the best anyone can really do is guess -- is that they are both wrong.

True, as the "bad cop" in this drama, the Bush administration's uncompromising stance toward the North has no doubt convinced Pyongyang that Washington is not about to return to the good old days when it seemed to be bending over backward to engage with the now officially branded member of Bush's "axis of evil."

Any future talks between the United States and North Korea can be expected to be tough and demanding, with little prospect of Pyongyang being rewarded just for showing up. As a result, talks with Seoul (or even with Tokyo) seem much more promising (and potentially rewarding). It is equally true that President Kim -- the quintessential "good cop" -- has been waving olive branches.

Pyongyang must surely realize that this window of opportunity is closing as December's South Korean presidential elections draw near. Besides, if dialogue with Washington still remains the ultimate goal, it's been made clear to Pyongyang that progress in North-South talks must come first.

But, why now? Essentially the same circumstances existed in October 2001, when the North inexplicably walked away from the latest round of discussions with the South, despite a long shopping list of promised actions and potential rewards. Who knows, had Pyongyang kept that particular ball rolling (and been a bit more forthcoming in voicing support for the war on terrorism), it might have even avoided the "evil" list. For whatever reason, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il saw fit once again in October to pull the rug out from under the Sunshine Policy.

Now, after meeting with South Korean special envoy Lim Dong Won (whose official career Pyongyang played a major role in ending), the North has agreed to resume high-level dialogue and selected other activities, such as the long-awaited resumption of divided-family exchange visits, in the latter case after forcing the South to agree to still tighter controls, including using the Mount Kumgang resort area as the primary venue (which prevents North Korean citizens from coming to the South and seeing for themselves the remarkable accomplishments achieved under democracy).

While one always welcomes any sign of North Korean cooperation, even under less than ideal circumstances and with the usual North Korean self-serving caveats, a bit of caution remains in order, given Pyongyang's previous tendency to renege on agreements. The fact that Pyongyang announced earlier this year that it was opening up this spring's Arirang Festival in North Korea (which also commemorates the 90th anniversary of the country's founder, Kim Il Sung's birth) to international visitors -- and then boldly predicted that 200,000 or more tourists would come -- raises the possibility that narrow economic motives (and pride -- imagine the embarrassment if few show up) may be the main reason for the latest overtures, rather than a genuine desire to promote peace and reconciliation.

It remains anyone's guess as to how many World Cup tourists to the South will decide also to venture North, and whether this latest sign of North Korean cooperative behavior will last beyond (or even until) the World Cup's final round.

Even if the Arirang Festival is not the primary motivator, it's clear that economics is. The Joint Press Release signed during Lim's visit focuses heavily on the revitalization of the North-South Committee for the Promotion of Economic Cooperation, and goes so far as to note that one round of talks will be held at the North Korean resort location "to pep up the tour of Mount Kumgang."

Although dates were set for all other meetings, the two sides merely agreed "to recommend that the respective military authorities resume talks" while placing the opening of rail and road corridors through the demilitarized zone under the purview of the Economic Cooperation committee. The North continues to avoid discussing security matters with Seoul.

Meanwhile, it is useful for proponents of the "good cop, bad cop" approach to recognize that this tactic works best when both cops are in agreement as to how best to play the game. This hardly seems to be the case between Washington and Seoul today.