Airstrikes won’t end Iran’s nuclear ambitions — diplomacy might

It’s easy to start a war. It’s hard to end one.

U.S. President Donald Trump is going to learn this lesson in the weeks ahead unless he stays firmly focused on the objective that has guided action against Iran in the last few weeks: The end of its nuclear program and ensuring the stability of the Persian Gulf region.

Confusion is frequent during conflict. It’s called the fog of war for a reason. Information gleaned from the battlefield is unreliable, gathered under difficult conditions from far away. Opponents have reasons to exaggerate wins and hide losses to shape perceptions and gain valuable psychological advantage during a conflict. Deception is rife and ambiguity itself can confer tactical and strategic advantages. Nevertheless, there is pressure to reach conclusions quickly so that pressing decisions can be made.

It is not surprising, then, that there is considerable confusion about the success of the U.S. bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities. After the Israeli air force virtually eliminated Iran’s air defenses, Trump launched his own air strikes, deploying the bunker-busting bombs that can destroy Tehran’s deeply buried nuclear sites and that only the U.S. has.

Immediately after the attack, Trump told the world in a televised address that the three sites — the Fordo nuclear enrichment plant and the Isfahan and Natanz nuclear facilities — were “completely and totally obliterated.” That contrasts with the judgment of Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the world’s nuclear watchdog, who said “no one — including the IAEA — is in a position to assess the underground damage” to the critical Fordo site.

Other U.S. officials were more cautious than their president. Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that “Initial battle damage assessments indicate that all three sites sustained extremely severe damage and destruction.” Moreover, it has been suggested — and satellite photos appear to confirm — that Iran moved much of its enriched uranium stockpile from the facilities before the attacks.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio conceded that certainty was elusive but “we have to assume that” much of Iran’s enriched uranium was buried underground at Isfahan. Since knowledge cannot be destroyed, that leaves the critical question: Has the U.S. ended Iran’s nuclear ambitions or only delayed them? A report by one U.S. intelligence agency, dismissed as “fake news” by U.S. officials, concluded that the bombings only slowed Tehran by several months.

That uncertainty is compounded by doubts surrounding Iranian intentions before the attack. The consensus of the U.S. intelligence community earlier this year was that Iran was up to three years away from being able to deliver a nuclear weapon to a target of its choosing. Trump himself dismissed that conclusion, countering that Iran was only weeks from acquiring a nuclear capability.

Much now depends on what Iran does. Immediately after the air strikes, Trump said that additional U.S. action was contingent on Iran’s response. If Tehran does not retaliate, the U.S. would do nothing else. In his remarks after the strikes, Trump warned that “Iran, the bully of the Mideast, must now make peace. If they do not, future attacks will be far greater.”

Prior to the U.S. attack, Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, warned of “everlasting consequences” if Washington made a move. Afterward, he said that Iran “reserves all options to defend its sovereignty, interest and people.” If it chooses to respond, it has ample options. There are some 40,000 U.S. military personnel deployed on bases and warships throughout the Middle East. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps warned that “the number, dispersion and size of U.S. military bases in the region are not a strength, but have doubled their vulnerability.”

Tehran has other options too. It could try to close the Strait of Hormuz to squeeze international oil markets. It could deploy its formidable cyber forces as weapons of mass disruption. Or it could dispatch proxies to launch terror attacks elsewhere in the world. All would threaten chaos and a wider war.

Fortunately, history offers grounds for hope. After the U.S., in the first Trump administration, killed Qasem Soleimani, one of Iran’s most senior and respected generals, in a drone strike, the region braced for a wider war. Iran restrained itself. And the immediate reply to last week’s U.S. bombing was a calibrated attack on the al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Warned in advance by Iran, the U.S. suffered no casualties. Trump dismissed the response as “very weak.”

Iran’s ultimate stance will likely depend on U.S. intentions. Once again, the U.S. has not been a model of clarity. The day after the attack, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that “This mission was not and has not been about regime change,” a line echoed by Vice President JD Vance. Rubio was equally clear, saying that the assault “was not an attack on Iran. It was not an attack on the Iranian people. This wasn't a regime change move.”

Trump undid all that messaging by noting on social media that “If the current Iranian Regime is unable to MAKE IRAN GREAT AGAIN, why wouldn't there be a Regime change???”

Confused? So are we. The Iranians are likely to be as well, especially when the Israeli government remains committed to the overthrow of the regime in Tehran, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu calling on Iranians to take to the streets to do so.

That is unlikely. It is far more probable that the Iranian public will rally around the regime — despised though it may be — in a display of nationalism.

Instead, the West should press for a diplomatic solution to this crisis. As the IAEA’s Grossi said, “we must return to the negotiating table,” press for the return of IAEA inspectors and get an accounting for Iran’s uranium stockpiles. “We have a window of opportunity to return to dialogue and diplomacy. If that window closes, violence and destruction could reach unthinkable levels and the global nonproliferation regime as we know it could crumble and fall,” Grossi added.

A deal is possible, but it will be difficult. Negotiations will demand patience, a quality that President Trump has rarely demonstrated. Having ripped up the 2015 agreement that Iran reached with its previous interlocutors, trust is in short supply. His readiness to use negotiations as cover while preparing an attack has raised still higher the bar for diplomacy. The humiliation of the combined U.S.-Israeli assault will make it ever harder for Tehran to agree to some deal.

Yet only a negotiated settlement will allow international inspectors to return, a prerequisite to any resolution of this crisis and confidence about ending Iran’s nuclear program. Ironically, however, after the recent attacks, Iran will demand additional incentives before agreeing to that condition. Iran’s National Assembly has already passed legislation to suspend cooperation with the IAEA.

We can anticipate Tehran’s demands. They will include lifting of at least some economic sanctions and accepting a heavily monitored civilian grade enrichment program, limited to 3.5% grade fuel. The U.S. and Israel will not be happy with either step, but successful diplomacy will require compromises and concessions from both sides.

The alternative is continued conflict as Iran’s nuclear ambitions fester and governments in Tel Aviv and Washington periodically resort to force to stop them. That is a recipe for permanent war. It must be avoided. Of that we can be certain.