DOWNFALL: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, by Richard B. Frank. New York: Random House, 1999, 484 pp., $35 (cloth).

The tragic folly of the war-mongering leaders of Imperial Japan and their casual disregard for the welfare of their fellow citizens seem almost forgotten because the end of the Pacific War is controversially tied to the atomic bombs that halted the savage conflict. Richard Frank persuasively argues that this vainglorious elite deserves blame and condemnation for the suffering endured by Japanese civilians and soldiers during World War II. He is especially critical of their obdurate stance in the closing months of the war, when the outcome was a foregone conclusion.

In "Downfall," revisionist critics of U.S. insistence on unconditional surrender and the decision to use the atomic bomb are found guilty of ignoring substantial evidence that refutes their analysis. Frank asserts that the focus on what U.S. leaders did and why they did it deflects attention from the fact that it was Japanese leaders who rejected opportunities for a cessation of hostilities and forced their nation to keep waging a relentless war of attrition.

The cynical sacrifice of so many Japanese (and Okinawans and other Asians) by hardline military leaders eager to salve their wounded pride and improve Japan's negotiating position extended the war and led to the cataclysmic atomic bombings. As late as June 1945, an Imperial Conference confirmed the government's commitment to waging war and revealed just how delirious the military leadership was at the prospect of a glorious fight to the finish. The government was committed to the "ketsu-go" strategy of waging a battle on the home islands that would prove costly enough to get the war-weary Americans to the negotiating table and secure more favorable terms. To this end, the military had prepared a slaughterhouse in Kyushu in anticipation of a planned U.S. invasion.