U.S.-China tensions rise as the tides begin shifting

Can you feel the ground shifting? I’m not referring to the temblors that recently struck Japan. Rather, I’m talking about what looks like a growing sense of frustration in China as it deals with the United States.

The Asian giant is a country that once exulted in a rise to power ordained by historical forces and has been looking shaky and uncertain as it competes — my word, not that of the Chinese; they don’t believe that concept captures this moment — with the West.

Irritation colored last week’s brief visit to China by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, with Chinese officials from President Xi Jinping down making clear their displeasure with U.S. policy. Other developments amplify Chinese anxiety. Europe, once viewed as a reliable softener of Western policy against Beijing, appears to be taking a harder line. Add recent measures to update and strengthen Indo-Pacific security mechanisms and mounting unease seems reasonable.

There has been, and continues to be, a robust debate over which is more dangerous, a weak China or a strong China? That misstates the key question: The pivot isn’t the actual balance of power but is instead Beijing’s perception of that balance. Insecurity is likely to be more dangerous to regional peace than a sense of invulnerability fueled by a belief that time is on its side.

Blinken’s visit to China sought to build on the summit between President Biden and President Xi that was held in San Francisco last year. Both sides came away from that meeting claiming that a floor had been set for the relationship, guardrails had been strengthened and that bilateral relations would be stabilized as a result. Chinese experts I’ve encountered have been eager to seize the moment and resume conversations to try to guarantee that future. There was almost a sense of urgency.

Still, there has been progress. China is beginning to take steps to stem the flow of fentanyl, the number one killer of Americans between the ages of 18 and 45, into the U.S. Direct military-to-military communications have resumed at multiple levels. The two governments agreed to hold bilateral talks on artificial intelligence and how to manage the risks it could create.

Today, however, competition, not cooperation, seems to define the relationship. U.S. officials would reject that characterization although Blinken proclaimed that the Biden administration “is very clear-eyed about the challenges posed by the PRC and about our competing visions for the future.”

His list of grievances is detailed, ranging from China’s support for Russia’s war against Ukraine to creating industrial overcapacity that is “flooding markets, undermining competition, putting at risk livelihoods and businesses around the world.” High on his list of concerns is aggressive actions in the South and East China Seas that threaten freedom of navigation and commerce in those waters.

China denies the charges and counters with its own bill of particulars. In their meeting, Xi told Blinken that their two countries “should be partners, not rivals ... they should seek common ground while reserving differences, instead of competing viciously.” Most revealing, in my reading of the Chinese report of the meeting, is his comment that “they should be true in word and resolute in deed, rather than saying one thing and doing another.”

Foreign Minister Wang Yi went further in his five-and-a-half-hour meeting with Blinken. He warned that “negative factors in the relationship are still increasing and building and the relationship is facing all kinds of disruptions.” Significantly, he complained about U.S. steps to cut trade with China, pointing to “endless measures to suppress China's economy, trade, science and technology. This is not fair competition, but containment.” (In turn, the U.S. denies those charges.)

Wang insisted that “China’s legitimate development rights have been unreasonably suppressed.” He echoed Xi, who told Blinken that “We hope the U.S. can also look at China’s development in a positive light. This is a fundamental issue that must be addressed.”

The emphasis on China’s development is revealing. It betrays unease about the slowing Chinese economy. The International Monetary Fund projects four years of declining growth as a result of demographic headwinds, real estate troubles and rising unemployment. The industrial policies that give rise to complaints about overcapacity are a response to those difficulties.

The real fear is that these aren’t just speed bumps. Rather, this moment is an inflection point, one with profound implications for China. Writing in the Financial Times last November, Ruchir Sharma, chair of Rockefeller International, was explicit, stating that “China’s rise as an economic superpower is reversing.” Highlighting China’s declining share of global gross domestic product in nominal terms as reflected in government data, he notes that this reversal is “by Beijing’s own account.”

Economic issues aren’t the only source of anxiety. Beijing is unnerved by growing suspicion of China in Asia, manifested in strengthened security ties between the U.S. and its allies in the region. These include the revived Japan-U.S.-South Korea trilateral partnership announced last August, the Japan-U.S.-Philippines mechanism celebrated at the Washington summit in April or continuing progress in the AUKUS partnership, a trilateral security tie-up between Australia, the U.K and the U.S. Reflecting that new strength are Washington’s reiterations of its commitment to the defense of those allies.

Various configurations of countries are holding joint exercises, with the most recent iteration of U.S.-Philippine military training featuring the Mid-Range Capability missile system, the first time a land-based intermediate-range missile has been deployed in the region since the collapse of the U.S.-Russia Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. That’s a potentially powerful addition to the U.S. arsenal, one considered unthinkable a year ago.

Meanwhile, Europe, once thought softer than the U.S. toward China, is getting tougher too. European nations, individually and through NATO, are more deeply involved in Indo-Pacific security. Several of those militaries are establishing a regular presence in the region; national security documents articulate its relevance to their national interest. The threat isn’t abstract: Several individuals have been arrested throughout Europe in recent weeks on charges of spying for China.

The European Union has developed and is using a number of new tools to counter China’s anti-competitive practices. The EU is investigating Chinese subsidies in several sectors — trains, wind turbines, medical devices and solar panels — and has raided the European offices of some of those businesses. European governments have joined the U.S. in restricting access to critical high-tech products.

All this is occurring on the eve of Xi’s trip to Europe, his first in five years. A recent Politico article concluded that “Europe’s phony war with China is at an end. ... Europe is now showing it is willing to get tough on Beijing.”

Circumstances have changed, but it is no time for glee. Deterrence requires both credible threats — “one more step and I shoot” — and the reassurance that restraint will be rewarded — “stop and I won’t.” Three U.S. China experts reiterated that key point late last year in Foreign Affairs, the U.S. foreign policy journal of record. They argued that Washington needs to draw lines in regard to Taiwan to allay Beijing’s fear that the U.S. will support independence.

To be clear, they are not downplaying the threat China poses to Taiwan or suggesting that the U.S. pursue an “assurance first” strategy to appease Beijing. Rather, they rightly believe that a jittery, insecure mainland is dangerous and the U.S. should do more to reduce that nervousness. After all, states tend to jump through windows of opportunity when they are closing.

This is a good way to think about the U.S.-China relationship more generally. The U.S. should make clear that it is not seeking to bring down the Beijing government — yet. A China committed overturning the regional and global status quo or to destabilizing unilateralism is another matter, however.

The problem, I’ve long argued, is that China’s call for mutual respect for "core interests" — originally defined as Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, now perhaps including the South China Sea — is in fact a demand for “deference” to Beijing’s definition of its "core interests."

In the Taiwan case, the U.S. understands the central role the island plays in Chinese thinking, and especially the Beijing government’s legitimacy. That is why successive U.S. administrations have not backed independence; that is “respect.” That does not mean that the U.S. will support the call for unification, however; that would be “deference.”

The bright lines are growing dimmer as economic competition between China and the West intensifies, given the strategic consequences. Strategic and direct communication, within the West and between the West and China, is more vital than ever as a result. There must be clarity of thought and messaging to reduce the chances of misperception and miscalculation. This is most essential in times of great change or great stress, as is the case today.