The early years of the 20th century witnessed Germany in relentless pursuit of Great Britain, the country that ruled the seven seas. What were Germany’s intentions? Did Germany pose a threat to Great Britain? Was it already an enemy state?

In 1907, Sir Eyre Crowe, a British diplomat and the Foreign Office’s foremost authority on Germany, wrote down his personal impressions in a memorandum. Crowe concluded that Germany aimed to establish hegemony, first in Europe and eventually the world, that Germany was an emergent threat to Great Britain and that trying to ascertain its intentions was useless — what mattered was Germany’s capabilities.

The power that a country projects is the sum total of its purpose and abilities. And this power is relative. However, sometimes the balance of power between countries changes drastically. At such times, one must clearly grasp the extent of a rival’s power, balance against it and make sure this rival does not come to believe it can unilaterally overturn the status quo. Crowe argued that it was time for Great Britain to strengthen its defensive capabilities.

Maintaining or expanding deterrent power is essential to keeping the peace. This means that one must continually prepare for war in order to avoid one.

Crowe’s insights carry significant implications for Japan today. China, North Korea and Russia — the neighbors that could pose a threat to Japan — are all authoritarian states characterized by individual dictatorships. The policymaking process is opaque under such political systems, making it difficult to predict intentions. This makes it all the more essential for Japan to focus on assessing its rivals’ capabilities rather than intentions and to have an accurate grasp of its own capabilities.

In the 20th century, wars became “all-out” or “total” in nature. Economic power and technological prowess became decisive. This has not changed. Since the 2010s, as China emerged as an economic superpower, it began using its economy for geopolitical purposes — through strategic subsidies, military-civil fusion and economic coercion. In the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War, both Russia and the West have unleashed economic sanctions on the main battlefields of energy and finance. What is needed is an economic security policy that protects and nurtures economic power so that it can be deployed for attack when necessary.

In this century, the fiercest battles of any “total war” will likely be fought in cyberspace. The countries of the world are starting to understand “national cyber power” as an essential indicator of overall national power.

“National power” must be understood in dynamic terms. National power can expand abruptly when countries dare to embrace revolutionary technologies and innovations. A perfect example of this is China’s “leapfrog” growth strategy, which has made the utmost use of the digital revolution since the 1990s.

In the future, the most critical strategic fields for determining national power may well be “computing power,” with high functionality and low power consumption, and the next-generation semiconductors needed to support this computing infrastructure. This field might represent Japan’s last chance to reclaim its dominance within the semiconductor industry. The Japanese government should make high-risk, high-return investments in private companies and support technology development and mass production.

Science and technology are the foundation of national power. Innovation occurs when the fruits of scientific and technological R&D are implemented in society, giving rise to new markets. Converting science and technology into sources of national strength thus requires the power of social implementation. Strategic dialogue between government and corporations and cooperation between industry, government and academia, is indispensable to such implementation. The U.S., which quickly developed, approved, produced and marketed mRNA COVID-19 vaccines at the height of the pandemic, maximized its capacity for implementing technological innovations in society.

In order to radically strengthen defense capabilities, Japan should not dream of a defensive power that exceeds national power. At the same time, the country should not approach national power as something that is fixed — for example, by envisioning a “defense power commensurate with national power.” When national strategy makes the strengthening of deterrence capabilities both essential and urgent, accelerating the buildup of defensive capabilities that outstrip national power may become necessary. This is one such time for Japan.

Increases to defense spending, however, must be accompanied by governance reforms. If existing systems and structures, decision-making processes and personnel deployments are simply increased without reform, the result will be nothing but added cost. If Japan is to truly strengthen its combat and continuous defense capabilities, the nation must establish a permanent joint command and joint commander capable of conducting rapid cross-domain operations spanning not only land, sea and air domains, but also space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. By introducing such governance reforms, the impact of increased spending will be multiplied many times over.

Defensive capabilities can also be augmented through alliances. The possession of strike capabilities (counterattack capabilities), including missiles, is essential to building deterrence. In order to effectively demonstrate such strike capabilities, including ISR and targeting, it is imperative that Japan clarify with the U.S. their division of roles and mutually complementary functions, improve interoperability and share strategies.

This is defensive force based on national power. In the end, however, Japan must also remember that nations owe their existence to defensive force.

Yoichi Funabashi is the chairman of the Global Council of the International House of Japan and former editor-in-chief of the Asahi Shimbun. This is a translation of his column in the monthly Bungei Shunju.