Can the differing world reactions to India's missile test and North Korea's attempted "satellite launch" be explained by the familiar saying that success has a thousand fathers while failure is an orphan? The more likely explanation is that the two tests are forcing the international community to confront implicit assumptions and contradictions with respect to the threat posed by nuclear weapons.
When the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed in 1968, it had a three-way bargain. It was drafted and negotiated by some of those within the nuclear club. Not surprisingly, therefore, it embedded their interests and priorities. The nonnuclear countries were permitted access to technology and material to harness nuclear energy for civilian and development use if they forswore forever any plans to get the bomb. In return, the nuclear haves promised eventually to give up their own nuclear weapons.
But there was a marked imbalance of obligations, privileges and benefits. The nonproliferation requirement was precise, legally binding, verifiable by the International Atomic Energy Agency as the U.N. nuclear watchdog, and enforceable by the U.N. Security Council. The disarmament promise was vague, voluntary, not subject to verification, and not enforceable.