CHIANG MAI, Thailand -- It may be presumptuous to review Asia-Pacific regional organizations in a single column, but there seems to be so much confusion about them that certain points need to be clarified and properly addressed. The main groups are the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and ASEAN plus 3 (Japan, China, South Korea).

Through APEC, Asia reaches out to U.S. shores; and through ASEM, to Europe. Through ASEAN plus 3, Southeast Asia reaches out to Northeast Asia. Through ARF, a first attempt is made toward discussing security issues.

Has the geographic image of Southeast Asia become so blurred that it has been absorbed into a wider notion of East Asia comprising both Southeast and Northeast Asia regions? Often this seems to be the case, although in our opinion the previous delineation is still valid and useful.

Many analysts appear too skeptical about the future role of so many regional groupings under current globalization conditions. APEC is viewed quite pessimistically; for ASEAN the term sunset organization has been coined; SAARC is thought to be almost irrelevant; and ARF is criticized as a simple talk forum.

Such views are partially justified, but let's try to analyze the reasons for each case. Starting with South Asia, one could say that, indeed, SAARC has somehow fallen below original expectations. The main problem is its composition: Although SAARC would be meaningless without the participation of India and Pakistan, it falls victim to both countries' historic antagonisms, which block not only deliberations but also the convening of sessions at times. If the conflict between these two countries ever subsides, there is ample space for regional cooperation in the areas initially identified for nonconfrontational cooperation.

APEC constitutes a convincing case for pondering membership limitations. It seems that the organization has lost momentum because it has outgrown its potential. At first, every one wished to join; now great numbers of participants cause dislocations, leading to less flexibility and creative drive.

ARF was never intended to be a comprehensive security mechanism, like an Asian NATO. If one views it as a low-profile formation for gradual trust-building and as a forum for more open security discussions, it is still relevant and useful. Enthusiasm for it waned after the 1997 economic crisis, but it can still play a role in a domain that was completely uncovered previously.

As for ASEAN itself, this observer has repeatedly evaluated it positively, joining in some criticism but not to the extent of making prophecies of the group's sunset. With a long history, ASEAN benefits from a balanced membership. Of course, one could talk of discrepancies in the levels of democratic achievements, but both peninsular and maritime Southeast Asia are properly included.

One objection is that it has represented elite, political, economic and bureaucratic interests without the people's participation. The fact that ASEAN is much more important now than ever as the voice of nongovernment organizations, peasants, environmentalists and others does not mean that up to now it has been unholy and undemocratic. Technocrats naturally have played, and are playing, a considerable role, but always under the directives of elected politicians, representing member nations' societies at large. (In one or two cases politicians are not properly elected, but that's the exception rather than the rule and is a different matter anyhow.)

If politicians were considered unrepresentative of their electorates, there would be a singularly subjective interpretation beyond ASEAN's scope. Independent of this argument, leaders responsible for these regional groupings make a bigger effort nowadays to consult with NGOs and others.

ASEM may be a little too ambitious as it tries to cover a large area of participants that tend to maintain their own bilateral links. But it still has a role to play, especially if followup procedures are correctly designed to retain the momentum created during ministerial or summit meetings. There is some apprehension over the difficulty that individual bureaucracies have in coping with so many overlapping gatherings.

The case of ASEAN plus 3 will depend on the delicate balances between the main pillars, China and Japan, of which the original creators of the group are certainly conscious.

All players in the region are hoping for a clear U.S. Asian policy that will contribute to the region's stability and prosperity, ideally in a balanced coordinated effort with China and Japan.