SEOUL -- In less than a month, Koreans will commemorate the first anniversary of the historic inter-Korean summit. In mid-June last year, the leaders of the divided country met for the first time and vowed to open a new chapter in peninsular relations. Numerous political and academic events will take place in commemoration of the epochal Pyongyang summit. The North-South Joint Declaration signed by the two leaders will undoubtedly be a focal point of many deliberations. Every one of the five paragraphs of that declaration contains a program for shifting away from a hostile past to a more amicable future. "The South and the North have agreed to resolve the question of reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the Korean people," the opening paragraph stipulates, demonstrating the desire of both leaders to work out solutions to the problem of division without foreign interference.

Recent developments show, however, that this notion of independence has not progressed beyond wishful thinking. Koreans did set out on a new road to cooperation and reconciliation after their historic summit, with spectacular inter-Korean encounters taking place. But before long the peacemaking process came to a sudden standstill. Future historians may come up with an empirically verified answer to the question of what exactly caused this impasse. For now, most analysts are holding the new U.S. administration responsible. For many Koreans, recent developments offer further proof that progress in inter-Korean relations is dependent on U.S. support.

"I really think that the U.S. administration's hardline policy is affecting our relationship with North Korea," said South Korea's foreign minister, Han Seung Soo, confirming the fact that Seoul's North Korea policy depends on the good will of the United States. This is a remarkable statement for South Korea's top diplomat to make, as it deviates from the customary official proclamations that Seoul and Washington act in concert and that the U.S. has always supported South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy. On several occasions during his recent visit to Korea, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage stressed this point. But such expressions of support are really just diplomatic niceties, uttered to demonstrate harmony between important allies. In reality, fundamental differences of opinion exist over how to deal with North Korea.

"It is not possible to reconcile the words of support for President Kim with the abrupt public change in direction of the Bush administration," says an American friend who has followed Korean developments for many years.

It has been argued that U.S. policy has not in fact changed direction, since the policy is now being revised. In a way, this sounds plausible, but it ignores the political reality. The temporary cessation of all interaction between Washington and Pyongyang has effectively killed the momentum of the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. "Delay is destruction," notes one U.S. analyst. "Under the guise of a long-term policy review, that may well be what the conservatives in the Bush White House intended."

Some observers are also asking whether enough has changed in and around the Korean Peninsula to justify yet another comprehensive revision and trigger a virtual suspension of U.S. diplomacy in one of the globe's political hot spots. It should be recalled that the latest review of U.S. policy vis-a-vis North Korea dates back just two years. In 1999, President Bill Clinton assigned former Defense Secretary William Perry to review the U.S.' options. Perry, who is a Republican, one should note, took 10 months to come up with his conclusions.

More recently, Washington has been sending mixed signals to the North Koreans: On the one hand, the Bush administration decided to provide 100,000 tons of emergency food aid to Pyongyang, but on the other it also did what it could to bar the North Koreans from joining the Asian Development Bank as observers. Seoul has been lobbying for North Korea's membership to this international body for a long time, and Washington's negative stance was widely described as a political blow for Kim. "This unrelenting U.S. posture on North Korea is a setback for South Korea's Kim, who believes North Korea has perceptibly changed and will become a responsible member of the international community with a little encouragement and support from South Korea and the outside world," one commentator noted.

Interestingly, North Korea's membership in the ADB has been one of the options favored in the so-called Armitage Report, authored in 1999 by the present deputy secretary of state. This report was conceived as a critical -- and conservative -- response to the more liberal approach of the Clinton administration. For a better understanding of the Republicans' assessment of North Korea, it is well worth looking through Armitage's paper. On the currently hot missile question, the report advocates a combative course of action: "If (North Korean) missile exports continue and the U.S. can identify them, we should do what we can to intercept the ships."

It will be interesting to see whether this militant rhetoric, committed to paper while Armitage was in opposition, will find its way into the final guidelines for the Bush administration's North Korea policy.

In the meantime, the Seoul government hopes to influence the U.S.' decision-making process, expressing confidence that, in the end, not much will change. "We should make concerted efforts to prevent any schism with Washington," Kim said recently.

One issue with the potential of creating a rupture is the U.S. missile-shield plan. Many South Koreans worry that the controversial issue will throw them into a struggle between the U.S. and China. "It will begin a new cold war in Northeast Asia," warns an assemblyman.

The South Koreans fall between two stools, as they would be forced to choose between their main ally or their brothers and sisters in the North. Pyongyang has left no doubt that it considers NMD just one more "imperialist ploy" and has warned the South against joining the project, as this would escalate tension and create "nothing but ruin and death."

Whatever policy decision the Kim administration makes regarding this delicate issue, NMD has already become a wedge in inter-Korean relations. This grand -- and deeply controversial -- military project might never be deployed, for purely technical reasons. But Washington's plans to proceed have already generated considerable political upheaval, estranging the Koreans and making them aware of the limits of their independence. This is a painful experience for a proud people less than one year after their historic summit.