It’s difficult to overstate the geopolitical significance of Taiwan’s upcoming presidential and legislative elections.
When the self-ruled island's 19 million eligible voters head to the polls on Jan. 13, they will not only decide who handles everyday domestic issues. Depending on the outcome, the closely watched vote could also have markedly different security and economic implications for the entire region.
At stake is how Taipei will manage relations with China over the next four years amid worsening cross-strait ties and a heightened risk of conflict between Washington and Beijing, the latter of which hasn’t ruled out seizing the island by force, despite growing indications that the U.S. may be willing to defend it.
The strategically located island is now considered the greatest potential flash point between China and the United States — Taiwan’s main weapons supplier and most vocal supporter — a point that was reiterated by Chinese leader Xi Jinping when he met U.S. President Joe Biden in San Francisco last month.
While a Chinese invasion of the island is unlikely anytime soon, Beijing remains concerned about what it sees as Washington’s attempt to gradually change the status quo by, for instance, strengthening security ties with Taiwan.
Exacerbating Beijing’s concerns is the island’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is favored to win a third consecutive term. The traditionally independence-minded party maintains that China and Taiwan are separate entities and that the island is de facto independent — a position that clashes with Beijing's view of it as a Chinese province.
Fueling the tensions is Beijing’s ongoing military and economic coercion of the island, as well as the increasing militarization of the region. With dangerously close encounters at sea and in the air on the rise, there are growing concerns that a conflict could be triggered by a miscalculation, particularly as Washington and Beijing adopt firmer postures on Taiwan amid their intensifying geostrategic rivalry.
“The Taiwan election will influence the degree of risk perceived by the Asia-Pacific region, not only in terms of a possible war over the island, but also supply chain continuity, and a general worsening of Sino-U.S. relations that would be felt across the Asia-Pacific,” said Chase Blazek, East Asia analyst at U.S.-based geopolitics and intelligence firm RANE.
Who is running?
Whoever wins the pivotal election will face the daunting task of managing relations with both superpowers, a delicate balancing act, but one that also offers the new leader an opportunity to tamp down regional tensions.
Leading what has become a three-way race to succeed the DPP’s President Tsai Ing-wen, who will step down after eight years because of term limits, is her vice president and fellow party stalwart, Lai Ching-te.
As of early December, polls put the 64-year-old Lai several points ahead of the main opposition Kuomintang (KMT) candidate, New Taipei Mayor Hou Yu-ih, who has criticized the DPP for stoking tensions with China and called for returning to a policy of engagement with Beijing.
In third place currently is the Taiwan’s People’s Party (TPP) candidate, Ko Wen-je, a relative newcomer to national politics who is hoping to capitalize on voter dissatisfaction with both parties. Ko has sought to position his party in the middle of his two rivals, advocating a mix of deterrence and dialogue in dealing with China to avoid possible aggression and foster peace between the two sides.
Different scenarios
But the ability of the opposition to unseat the DPP may have been hampered after the KMT and TPP failed to agree on a joint ticket amid differences over how to use polling data to select who would be the presidential candidate.
Unless Taiwanese voters change their minds in the coming weeks, this very public disagreement may have dashed the opposition’s best hopes for the presidency, while increasing the likelihood Taiwan will continue to be a flash point in Sino-U.S. relations.
But the island’s presidential campaign has been full of twists and turns, and while the opposition may lose the presidential vote, it could still manage to win a majority in Taiwan’s parliament, the Legislative Yuan. Such an outcome could limit Lai’s ability to implement certain policies, which, in turn, would play into Beijing’s hands.
Experts say a hung parliament, meanwhile, would give Beijing an even greater incentive to work with Taiwan’s opposition while ignoring Lai.
Ian Chong, a professor of political science at the National University of Singapore, believes Beijing is likely to continue — and even increase — military and political pressure on Taipei in a bid to discredit and potentially frustrate a Lai administration into making mistakes.
The current vice president has vowed to guide the island to increased autonomy and security through closer relations with Washington and like-minded democracies. At the same time, he has committed to continuity, upholding four pledges Tsai outlined in 2021: Defending Taiwan’s freedom and democracy, safeguarding the island’s sovereignty, resisting pressure from Beijing and letting Taiwanese people decide the island’s future.
If Lai wins, Taiwan’s relations with the U.S. and Japan will only deepen across multiple issues and areas, said Chen Yu-Hua, an assistant professor at Akita International University. Other like-minded democracies would also likely follow suit in seeking to expand their “unofficial” relations with the island, he added.
The DPP’s foreign and security policies, while popular among many Taiwanese, have been a thorn in China’s side, so much so that Beijing cut off talks with the Tsai administration several years ago.
China has been particularly critical of Lai, who at one time identified himself as a "practical worker for Taiwan independence" — a red line for Beijing.
Lai has said this stance doesn't deviate from that of Tsai, who argues that Taiwan doesn’t need to formally declare independence as it is already a de facto sovereign nation. Yet the clarifications haven’t spared him from being called a “separatist” and “troublemaker” by Beijing, which has endorsed the KMT's framing of the upcoming election as a vote between war and peace.
However, this doesn’t necessarily mean China will immediately lash out at Lai if he is elected president.
If Lai takes the reins, Beijing is likely to “wait and see” before taking its next steps, said Zhiqun Zhu, an international relations professor at Bucknell University in Pennsylvania, noting that the months between Election Day and the inauguration in May will be critical.
Of particular importance, he added, would be Lai’s inauguration speech.
“Depending on how satisfied or dissatisfied Beijing is with the speech, it will take corresponding measures,” he said.
Such measures could also depend on whether Lai finds a mutually acceptable political formulation for the cross-strait relationship.
Indeed, experts believe that the election could present an opportunity to reduce tensions, something that would probably be easier in the case of a KMT victory, but not impossible under the DPP.
In a joint article for Foreign Affairs magazine, a group of East Asia experts recommended that, in the event of a Lai win, he should consider revisiting a proposal made by DPP legislators in 2014 to suspend the independence clause in the 1991 party charter. The nonbinding and reversible step, they said, would give any rhetorical commitment to the status quo more weight and credibility.
Such a step, the experts wrote, could “be part of a gradual, reciprocal process to reduce tensions and build trust.”
Giving Lai a chance to make such a move would also be in Beijing’s interest, as a continuation of China’s coercive tactics would only increase the Taiwanese people’s distrust of its giant neighbor and make the KMT and TPP’s more conciliatory positions less tenable in future elections.
But if Lai failed to make significant policy or rhetorical shifts, Beijing "may engage in exaggerated responses to try to paint him as radical," said Brian Hart, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
A KMT or TPP win, on the other hand, would likely spur Beijing to reinvigorate economic and diplomatic engagement with Taipei and tone down its military and economic coercion of the island.
Implications for Washington and Tokyo
As for U.S.-Taiwan ties, all three presidential candidates have pledged to continue strong security relations with Washington, and many believe this would continue even under a KMT government, although a KMT or TPP victory would probably bring more distance between the two partners.
“The U.S. government will accept whatever outcome of the election,” Zhu said, noting, however, that Washington may exert its influence on the island should it feel that the new government is moving too far from the status quo.
Cathy Wu, an assistant professor at Old Dominion University in Virginia, agreed, saying that while initial turbulence “may be inevitable,” the preservation of the status quo is likely to prevail.
“Any move toward formal independence is likely to be curtailed by Washington,” she added.
As for Japan, both the KMT and DPP enjoy close ties with Tokyo, and Taiwan's overall relations with Japan are unlikely to change significantly no matter who wins, although a KMT government may be less responsive to Japan's efforts to counter China.
As a result, Tokyo may prefer a DPP victory given the shared interest in countering China's growing power and expanding regional footprint.
Also, the DPP, for its part, “tends to defer to Japan regarding historical and territorial disputes, unlike the KMT, which has traditionally been unwilling to yield on such issues,” said Zhu.
However, some analysts expect the electoral outcome to affect ties between Tokyo and Beijing, particularly in the event of a DPP victory.
“As with the Sino-U.S. relationship, a DPP victory would likely act as a millstone around the neck of Japan-China relations,” said Blazek, noting that Tokyo would likely continue to improve links with Taiwan — however informally — under the DPP.
This would severely limit the prospects for Nos. 2 and 3 economies improving their relationship, and increase the odds of more economic competition and maritime tensions, he added.
Whatever the outcome, all eyes will be on what’s set to be the most consequential election in Asia in 2024, a vote that already has the world on edge.
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