Although Taiwan and Japan do not have formal diplomatic ties, the two neighbors seem to have found a way to deepen bilateral political engagement without running afoul of Tokyo’s "One China" policy — much to the chagrin of China.
By upgrading talks between their respective ruling parties, they have already held several foreign affairs and defense-related meetings in the past two years alone. The talks are part of efforts to deepen the relationship in key areas amid Beijing’s growing regional assertiveness and its push to isolate Taipei.
But while Tokyo has traditionally been close to Taipei, this political engagement and exchange model is not just limited to Japan, as Taiwan begins applying it to a host of delegations from around the world that are sending representatives to express support and deepen cooperation with the self-ruled island.
To get a better sense of how Taiwan is fostering political engagement with the international community while trying to gain and maintain diplomatic allies, The Japan Times spoke with Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu, who has served as the island’s top diplomat since 2018.
Wu also shares his views on other key issues, such as how Tokyo and Taiwan could bolster cooperation, the expansion of semiconductor giant TSMC, how a leadership change in Taipei could affect relations with Japan, Tokyo’s revised defense posture, the likelihood of a Chinese invasion in the near future and whether Taipei is counting on foreign support.
His answers have been edited for brevity.
Given the constraints outlined in the ‘One China’ policy, how important are “two-plus-two” meetings between the ruling parties in Japan and Taiwan to deepen political relations?
It is a very good idea for the two countries to take on this kind of exchange. Even though Japan is a very good friend of Taiwan, and Taiwan is a good friend to Japan, we understand the practical limitations of political interactions between the two sides, especially in the area of foreign policy or defense. These are limitations to us in government.
But for parliamentarians both in Japan and Taiwan, there are no limitations to their interactions. So it's very important for them to discuss topics of foreign policy and defense that are of mutual interest.
We in government encourage that, and I'm very glad this is taking place. And it's not only in the areas of foreign policy and defense, it's also going into economic ties. So we hope this kind of interaction between the two parties – the Japanese Diet, and Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan – can continue.
It is always a very good opportunity for the two sides to exchange all kinds of ideas, including regional security, Taiwan's international status or other matters that are important to each side.
Is this a model that Taipei has also envisaged for other countries?
Yes. Actually, it's starting already. If you look at the number of delegations coming from Europe, or even from the United States, it's just so many of them. We will have two delegations coming from France and more delegations from Germany.
We have many delegations, (U.S.) Congressional delegations coming to Taiwan as well.
The United States, they care a lot about Taiwan's security situation. They want to come over here not just to show support, but also to pick our brains to see what kind of ideas are going to be good for the security relations between Taiwan and the United States. It is the same in Europe. The European delegations are coming to Taiwan, they want to show support to Taiwan. At the same time, they want to beef up relations between Taiwan and Europe.
All sorts of parliamentary delegations have visited Taiwan and the purpose is always the same: They want to come to Taiwan, stand on Taiwanese soil and declare that they support Taiwan in the face of the threat coming from China. And they also want to speak with us on what kind of support they can show Taiwan, whether it's international participation or economic relations.
Whatever is developing between Taiwan and Japan, has been emulated by a lot of other countries.
Elections in Taiwan will take place next year. How do you think a victory by Taiwan’s main opposition party, the Kuomintang, would impact Taipei's ties with Tokyo?
In my view relations between Japan and Taiwan should go beyond any single party's considerations. Japan is far more important than a political party's own interests. We understand there are certain groups of people in the opposition who are anti-Japan. But if you look at those sensible leaders in the opposition, they understand it is very important to maintain good relations with Japan.
I would say that even if there is a transfer of power from one political party to another, the basic nature of Japan-Taiwan ties will remain the same, unless the new government adopts a radical approach. If they allow more radical elements like anti-Japan politicians to take the helm in making foreign-policy decisions, our relations with Japan might suffer. Even our relations with the United States might suffer because many people within the opposition view their relations with China as more important than our relations with the United States and Japan.
But I need to stress that most people here in Taiwan are pro-Japan. They consider themselves friends of Japan. The public opinion surveys here show Japan is the favorite country among the Taiwanese people. And that is going to be a condition against any government here in Taiwan to adopt a policy that is against Japan.
The number of Taiwan's formal diplomatic allies has continued to drop in recent years, with Honduras recently announcing plans to switch recognition from Taiwan to China. How important is diplomatic recognition to Taiwan and what is Taipei doing about it?
Many people ask us why we have to maintain diplomatic relations with those small countries. After all the most important countries to Taiwan will be Japan, the United States, the U.K., Australia, etc. But one basic fact is that Taiwan has been excluded from major international organizations such as the U.N., WHO, ICAO, UNFCCC etc. We want to be able to participate in these international organizations, and only our diplomatic allies will be able to speak forcefully for Taiwan. Therefore, we need to maintain diplomatic ties with all these allies.
In the last few years, we have been working very hard to make sure that our relations with diplomatic allies are in a very good situation. And indeed, the absolute majority of our diplomatic allies are very loyal to the relations with Taiwan. By keeping relations with these smaller countries, we have been able to do something for them, providing them with assistance that benefits the people in a model that I call the "Taiwan model."
It is necessary for Taiwan to maintain these diplomatic relations so that our voice can be heard internationally and for the international community to understand the kind of things Taiwan has been doing.
We also try to cultivate relations with countries that do not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Over the past few years, our relations with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the U.K., and the EU, individual European countries, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, have been making tremendous progress.
The reason for this is that we share the same values and economic interests. So we've been working with these countries more than ever. I cannot say that we should only rely on diplomatic allies, because these are small countries in smaller numbers. We also need to go out to the world to cultivate relations with fellow democracies.
In terms of establishing new partners, we don't exclude any possibilities. We only want to make sure that Taiwan is able to provide support to those people who want to seek support from Taiwan. Even if it is non-diplomatic recognition such as a representative office. But if there's any country that is willing to seek diplomatic recognition with Taiwan, we don't exclude that possibility. But it would only come when the two countries find the kind of diplomatic relations that are mutually beneficial.
Let's move on to the topic of semiconductors. U.S.-China ties are in free fall, with their rivalry extending to semiconductors, an area in which Taiwan plays a leading role worldwide. How concerned are you about the implications of this rivalry for Taiwan's semiconductor industry?
I'm not that concerned. There is a narrative the Chinese are trying to play up here in Taiwan that has been echoed or amplified by some in the opposition. The narrative is that the United States is trying to hollow out and destroy Taiwan's semiconductor industry because it won't allow Taiwan to be such a powerful country in producing computer chips. But the story is wrong.
If you look at Taiwan's investment in Arizona, the whole production, once it has matured, would only represent 5% of total output of TSMC. And if you look at TSMC's investment in Kumamoto, in the end, it would only produce a small fraction of the chips.
TSMC is a supergiant. They know what's best for the company. They want to have a little division of labor between Taiwan, the United States and Japan. And this is the situation so I'm not concerned that the Taiwanese semiconductor industry will be marginalized. We will continue to work with other countries. In fact, we are very happy to see that TSMC is making investments in different places. This represents the outreach or the outward expansion of Taiwan's semiconductor industry.
Let us focus now on the security situation in the region. How do you view Japan’s revised defense posture and its plans to reinforce defenses on islands close to Taiwan?
Strategically, we also face the same challenge. But deep down, we also understand that Japan is facing the same challenge coming from China.
Looking at the situation in the East China Sea, the Chinese surface ships, including the coast guard ships, or naval ships going through the disputed waters, nowadays, almost on a daily basis. And very often they will chase away the Japanese fishing boats. So this kind of situation has alarmed the Japanese decision makers for quite some time, even though they don't talk about this very openly. But I know this is a very serious challenge for Japan.
If you look at the Chinese military exercises these days, they are not only conducting them in the Taiwan Strait, sometimes they would go over to the East China Sea. Also, the Chinese navy and the Russian Navy have been conducting joint exercises in this region cruising around Japan. And sometimes their strategic bombers would also conduct joint military exercises.
Japan feels the threat. It might not be as much as Taiwan feels it coming from China. But the threat is coming from the same source. So I believe that Tokyo is looking at this and wants to get itself prepared.
And if you look at the Chinese military incursions into these areas, the Miyako Strait is a common waterway for Chinese military ships and also for their air force to go through the First Island Chain into the Pacific. This is not only threatening Taiwan, it is also threatening Japan.
So if you look at the revision of Japan’s defense documents, I think it means more than just for Taiwan. It means a lot for Japan itself. Therefore, when the Japanese government announced that it's going to increase its defense budget to 2% of GDP within the span of five years, I think that is the right way to deal with the threat Tokyo is facing. Tokyo is shouldering its own responsibilities for its defense, not just counting on the United States.
So, the situation faced by both Japan and Taiwan is rather similar. But Japan is a bigger country. It has a military alliance with the United States. It is a common understanding that the Japan-U.S. alliance is the bedrock of peace and stability in this region. So when Japan is willing to shoulder more defense responsibilities, I think it's a blessing, not just for Japan itself, but also the other countries in this region, including Taiwan, that face a military threat from the same source.
And if you look deeper into the kind of things that we may do together, that leaves a lot of room for good ideas on how Taiwan and Japan can work with each other. Nevertheless, defense is something that is for every country to take responsibility for themselves.
If you look at the Taiwan situation, we know that we need to shoulder our own responsibilities. Nobody has any responsibility to come to Taiwan and fight for Taiwan. It's the Taiwanese people who have to fight for themselves. If you ask the government, our military, and ordinary people over here, I think we have the will to fight for our freedom and our sovereignty. We want to make more investment in our defense, we want to reform our military so that we are capable of defending ourselves.
Turning back to Japan, we feel so much better knowing that Japan is going to take on more responsibilities in this area. Japan is making more investments than before in its own defense, including in deterrence. This is also a blessing for Taiwan.
Let me explain a bit further. Normally, the democracies in this region, beginning from (South) Korea, to Japan, to Taiwan to the Philippines, many countries would expect that the United States is going to shoulder a lot of responsibilities in this area. But if Japan is going to shoulder more, I think it's going to give the United States more freedom to provide protection to other countries in the region.
You said that Tokyo’s willingness to take on greater security responsibilities opens more possibilities for Taiwan and Japan to work together. What are those possibilities?
I need to say that lots of interactions between Taiwan and Japan should not be disclosed, especially in areas that are more sensitive. That said, I think it is necessary for the two countries to think more about how they can work with each other, beginning with less sensitive areas.
Actually, the two countries have been doing something already.
For example, Taiwan, and the United States launched the Global Cooperation and Training Framework in 2015, and Japan gradually became a co-sponsor or co-organizer of this framework. It provides training workshops for experts and officials in this broader region for specific purposes.
Some topics are actually related to security, such as cybersecurity, maritime security, disinformation as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. So these things are already under way and are non-sensitive. And we believe that Japan has the full intention to continue to work together with Taiwan and the United States to make sure that we can provide benefits to other countries in this region.
Of course, there are other areas where we might be able to cooperate, such as public health and the environment. So we have full intention to work more closely with Japan on these non-sensitive areas.
But if you look at the military side, when the Chinese are flying their planes and sending their ships or even aircraft carriers to cut through the Miyako Strait or Bashi Channel to conduct military exercises to the east of Taiwan, the two sides need to exchange information and know what they are preparing for to deal with contingencies. So these kinds of things should be a good starting point.
Delving deeper into the security situation in the region, what is Taipei’s view on the likelihood of a Chinese invasion and does Taipei expect direct military support from the U.S. and Japan in case of a contingency?
Let me say that first and foremost Taiwan counts on itself. We have the responsibility of defending ourselves. At the same time, we understand that the United States is going to be very important. They are providing arms to Taiwan, helping train our soldiers and trying to enable Taiwan to defend itself. So this is a good trend, and we'll continue to speak with the United States to make sure Taiwan has the capability to defend itself.
If you look at the increase of the military threat posed by China, the Chinese are conducting more military exercises around Taiwan. Their airplanes and ships are coming closer than ever. In fact, their aircraft are often encroaching the median line of the Taiwan Strait and sometimes come very close to the 24-nautical mile zone. It's very threatening. They seem to be compressing Taiwan’s defense depth while trying to wear down our platforms, soldiers and pilots. If you look at the long term trajectory, the Chinese military threat against one is going to become even more serious.
But whether China is going to launch a war against Taiwan, I'm not sure they will do it in a short while. The U.S. conclusion, their intelligence conclusion, is that it's not imminent. This is also our belief. There are a few variables Beijing would need to factor in before deciding to launch an attack against Taiwan. The first is legitimacy. If Taiwan is not threatening China, and China launches a war against Taiwan, I'm sure China is going to be heavily criticized, and there will be an international penalty on China, at least in terms of reputational cost.
China also has to calculate whether they will be able to take Taiwan within a short period of time. Given our increasing ability to be able to defend ourselves, I think it's going to become harder and harder for China to take over Taiwan within a short period of time.
The third calculation is that they need to take into consideration where the United States is going to get involved in a war, probably not coming directly to Taiwan, but to provide Taiwan with firepower. I'm sure, the Chinese would understand that such a move would also take a heavy toll on them, if the United States were to get involved one way or another.
Moreover, if China launched a war against Taiwan and failed to take over Taiwan within a short period of time, I think this would endanger the Communist Party's rule in China. They would lose legitimacy after making heavy investments in the PLA and propagating that Taiwan is part of China. So all these kinds of factors are being considered and I'm sure the Chinese government will be smart enough to integrate these possibilities into their own calculations.
But one thing that also should be considered is the classical analysis of an authoritarian regime. When an authoritarian regime is facing domestic difficulties, an easier way for them to unite the country is to create an external crisis. And they might want to create a crisis outside China so that they can keep the country together. In this sense Taiwan may be convenient for China. This is one scenario we are very concerned about. This kind of scenario has been discussed here in Taiwan and in other countries as well.
They're expanding their sovereignty control over the South China Sea. But is China's expansionism limited to the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait and South China Sea? I would say no. I would say that China is more ambitious than just these waters surrounding China. Chinese military exercises now are so frequent, even going through the "first island chain."
Sometimes they will go very far south even east of Guam doing naval exercises. The incident last April, when China signed a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, I think that's a wake-up call for a lot of countries in the Indo Pacific that China is very ambitious. Their ambition is projecting into the wide Pacific.
So all these countries are concerned about freedom and peace and stability and free and openness of the Indo-Pacific. They are making investments in the Pacific, including the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. I think all the countries that care about a free and open Indo-Pacific need to work together to ensure that there is a free and open Indo-Pacific and that authoritarianism does not go any deeper.
Some argue that the greatest risk for Taiwan at the moment is not a Chinese invasion, but rather that the island could be dragged into a conflict as Sino-U.S. ties continue to deteriorate. How concerned are you that Taiwan may get caught between the two superpowers should Sino-U.S. ties veer into conflict?
Regardless of whether the United States and China are engaged in a great power competition or not, I wouldn't describe Taiwan as caught in-between. China is threatening Taiwan and the United States is providing support for Taiwan.
The democracies are grouping together, and we want to side with the United States, which is providing us with economic, diplomatic and military support. The Chinese have been threatening Taiwan all these years, regardless of whether we have U.S. support or not.
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