Japan must be ready for an increasingly dangerous world

The Japanese government released its Defense White Paper this week, the annual assessment of the security environment and country’s response to it. It is a grim and dark analysis, warning with its opening line that the world “is now facing its greatest trial since the end of World War II.”

Disturbing though it sounds, it’s a reasonable conclusion. It is consistent with last year’s White Paper, and the world’s problems have only intensified in the year since it was published.

If there is a complaint to be issued against this year’s edition, it is its reluctance to fully address the impact of Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency. That reticence is understandable as a matter of diplomacy — Tokyo cannot afford to offend or antagonize its only ally. But we must hope that there is more than wishful thinking among Japan’s strategists and planners. The uncertainty emanating from Washington is no less concerning than that triggered by China, Russia or North Korea, the three countries identified in the White Paper as Japan’s primary regional security threats.

Last year’s Defense White Paper concluded that the country had “entered a new era of crisis.” Japan was, the authors wrote, “in the most severe and complex security environment of the postwar era” and the situation is “likely to become even more serious in the future.”

The situation remains dire. China continues to top the list of dangers. Its “external posture, military activities and other activities are a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community.” Indeed, China poses an “unprecedented” threat and “the greatest strategic challenge.”

Japan is rightly concerned by a 30-year defense modernization effort that has proceeded “without transparency” and resulted in a “broad and rapid improvement of its military power in qualitative and quantitative terms with focus on nuclear, missile, naval and air forces.”

The White Paper details the alarming activities of China’s People’s Liberation Army “throughout areas surrounding Japan,” including the East China Sea, especially near the Senkaku Islands, the Sea of Japan and the western Pacific Ocean. It singles out the Chinese Navy’s “intensified activities” in the South China Sea, which aim “to further promote unilateral change of the status quo by force, turning it into a fait accompli.” These are “directly connected” to regional peace and security, and thus a "legitimate concern” for Japan and the world.

Most disturbing is the repeated and increasing number of incidents in which Chinese vessels and aircraft enter Japanese airspace — and even into its territorial waters. These are, the White Paper notes, “of grave concern.”

Chinese officials reject all those accusations, arguing that the White Paper “holds a wrong perception of China, unreasonably interferes in China's internal affairs and hypes up the so-called China threat.”

China’s closer cooperation with Russia is also alarming. The expanding number of their joint military exercises and other activities “are clearly intended for demonstration of force against Japan.”

Moscow's ties with Pyongyang, evident in the latter’s provision of troops and weapons to help Russia fight in Ukraine, is another “key concern.” While North Korea already poses “a serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security,” there is, the White Paper warned, “a risk that Russia may transfer nuclear and missile-related technology to North Korea, which could have a long-term impact on the military balance in the Indo-Pacific.”

Essential to Japan’s security is Taiwan, considered a “renegade province” by Beijing, which China has long sought to unify with the mainland. There is fear that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will serve as a template for similar Chinese action against Taiwan, a mindset that has prompted warnings by Japanese leaders that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow” and that “security is indivisible.”

Moreover, the White Paper rightly notes the military balance between China and Taiwan has been rapidly tilting in China’s favor. This could recalibrate Chinese decision-making regarding the island, which poses a real danger to Japan, as the White Paper explained, “Stability in the situation surrounding Taiwan is important not only for the security of Japan, but also for the stability of the international community.”

Questions about Taiwan’s future also invoke the U.S. role. Previous American administrations have made clear their commitment to the island’s security, while maintaining “strategic ambiguity” about what that precisely entails. The Trump administration position is less clear; the defense establishment has hewed to traditional policies while the president himself has issued contradictory statements.

Given escalating strategic competition between the United States and China — a theme of the new White Paper — this uncertainty is troubling. In one of its asides, the White Paper refers to “the turbulent U.S.” The language is also laconic elsewhere, noting that developments in the U.S. have a “significant impact” on the regional security environment and “will continue to draw close attention.”

Japan, the White Paper notes, must work with “like-minded countries” to protect the regional status quo, strengthening cooperation “not only with allies, but also with as many countries as possible.” Reading between the lines suggests that there is some anxiety in Tokyo about the U.S.

"In addition to working with other nations, Japan has been increasing its defense budget, with the goal of spending 2% of its gross domestic product on defense by 2027. In addition to building national defense capacity, this blunts the U.S. charge that this country is "free-riding." The White Paper explained that the government is nearly two-thirds of the way toward that goal, with defense-related spending in the next fiscal year set to reach ¥9.9 trillion ($66.5 billion), or 1.8% of GDP by the 2022 benchmark.

That effort may count for little, however, if the U.S. insists that Japan spend 3% of GDP on defense — the figure earlier this year — or the new “global standard” of 5% announced last month. Japanese leaders have been right to counter that national defense spending must respond to national needs, not some arbitrary, artificial number.

That message needs to be sent to Japan’s ally and partners and to its public. Increased defense spending is increasingly contentious in the face of competing domestic demands for funds. The Japanese public has been slow to recognize the changes in the regional security environment and the mounting threats to their prosperity, safety and well-being.

The language that the Defense White Paper uses is troubling, speaking of “crisis” and “trials,” and a situation that is “serious” and “severe.” But that is to raise awareness among ordinary Japanese about the nature of the challenges that the country faces — and to alert adversaries that Tokyo is ready to respond. It is a call to action, one to which the nation must respond.