How India’s soft power led to a border deal with China

Recent events reveal India’s success in securing concessions from China.

Ending a four-year hiatus, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi resumed a structured dialogue at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, in October — after having held only unscheduled interactions since the 2020 Galwan Valley incident in which the Chinese and Indian armies clashed over the disputed border that divides them.

This seems to have been an opportune moment for the Chinese leadership to disengage its forces from territorial friction points and for India to resume border patrols, with both returning to pre-Galwan Valley incident positions.

Several strategic factors put pressure on China to change its stance. These included the holding of the BRICS summit with the possibility that Xi and Modi would not agree on some of the key points, the prospect that the American election would usher in a new administration with an unpredictable foreign policy and growing challenges in the Indo-Pacific.

In Kazan, Xi even stressed that India and China should work together as partners and not competitors and see the relationship as an opportunity for development, rather than a threat.

This contrasts sharply with Beijing’s assertive stance in the South China Sea, where it continues to reiterate its claim over Taiwan and adopt an aggressive posture toward the Philippines and other states. Notably, Xi has repeatedly urged China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to prepare for war.

On the contrary, India’s emphasis on diplomacy and dialogue led to conciliation with Beijing, creating a useful template for other countries embroiled in territorial disputes with China.

For decades, India and China have been locked in a confrontation centered on the 3,488 km-long border they share, known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Despite India’s repeated efforts to resolve the issue, the dispute remains, creating a volatile situation often marked by displays of military force, face-offs and even casualties.

The genesis of the disagreement can be traced back to postcolonial times. After India gained independence from the British in 1947 and the Communists won control of China in 1949, both nations initially sought cooperation. However, the 1962 war, initiated by Beijing, severely damaged bilateral relations, which remained strained for decades.

In 1989, following the Tiananmen Square crackdown, China faced global isolation. To repair its international image and avoid further estrangement, Beijing engaged with India and signed several confidence-building agreements in the decade starting from 1993 to maintain peace along the LAC and with the ultimate goal of resolving the border dispute.

However, Xi’s rise to power marked a decided shift. With the launch of the Belt and Road initiative (BRI) in 2013, Beijing sought to position itself as the leader of a China-centric order in Asia, encouraging India to align with its vision while sidelining the United States.

New Delhi rejected this, particularly due to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a flagship BRI project passing through Pakistan-administered Kashmir, which India regards as its territory. In response, China adopted a more aggressive posture along the LAC, attempting to dissuade India from supporting U.S.-led initiatives such as the construction of the Indo-Pacific as a geostrategic region and the “Quad” security dialogue comprising India, the U.S., Japan and Australia.

A turning point occurred in 2017, when China began constructing a road in Doklam, a disputed territory between China and Bhutan overlooking India’s strategic Siliguri Corridor, a stretch of land in West Bengal state.

Indian troops crossed the LAC for the first time to prevent the construction, resulting in a 73-day standoff with the PLA. Under Modi, India demonstrated its resolve to counter Chinese pressure and its unwillingness to compromise on territorial integrity. This display of strength enhanced India’s reputation as a credible regional counterbalance to China, encouraging other countries engaged in disputes with Beijing to view New Delhi as a reliable partner.

These dynamics did not augur well for the Chinese leadership, which escalated tensions and skirmishes along different sectors of the LAC, ultimately culminating in the June 2020 Galwan Valley clash.

New Delhi accused Beijing of building bunkers and obstructing the Indian army’s movements over the territory it claims. The confrontation resulted in the death of 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers — killings that hardened India’s stance, with Modi asserting that the Indian soldiers’ sacrifice would not go in vain and that the government would give a befitting reply, if provoked.

The two countries signed an agreement in February 2021 for complete troop disengagement and verification. However, a deep trust deficit persisted as they were unable to resolve all friction points and Chinese forces blocked Indian troops at key strategic nodes, thus limiting India’s patrolling abilities and access, for example to its Daulat Beg Oldi air base.

Rather than acquiescing to China’s aggressive overtures and reacting to Xi’s call for the PLA to prepare for war, India opted for a soft power approach. As well as engaging China through dialogue and diplomacy, New Delhi deepened its ties with Quad members to support a rules-based order leading to free and open Indo-Pacific — one that China intends to alter, even resorting to force. India’s joint military exercises with Japan and Australia are a case in point.

In addition, India strengthened its historic partnership with Russia, China’s key ally, by continuing its trade with Moscow despite Western sanctions, creating a scenario in which Russia would not be inclined to support China at the cost of compromising its ties to India.

In parallel, New Delhi also deepened relations with Washington, China’s key adversary, by signing four foundational security agreements and another for priority delivery of defense items, boosting military interoperability between the two countries. India also reaffirmed its commitment to the central role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Taken together, all these measures boosted India’s strategic heft and reinforced its position as a formidable peer competitor, allowing it to negotiate with China from a position of strength.

Simultaneously, China has faced mounting challenges, including growing tensions over Taiwan, ASEAN’s pushback in the South China Sea, the AUKUS security agreement between Australia, the U.S. and the United Kingdom, and Japan’s shift to collective defense. Coupled with an economic slowdown, these pressures have left Beijing in a precarious position in recalibrating its approach to India.

Pushing India too hard would risk driving it closer to the U.S. and Quad. Witnessing India’s economy grow faster than China’s and New Delhi's increasing influence in the region, the Chinese leadership opted for addressing the border dispute and recognizing India as a peer competitor, rather than an adversary.

A major achievement for India was to make China withdraw from disputed territory — China’s occupation of this land was exposed to the wider world and the retreat suggests that the territory occupied by the PLA does not belong to China.

Securing these concessions without resorting to military action marked a moral victory for New Delhi and implies that other territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific can be resolved through a soft power approach. India has created a template based on dialogue and diplomacy while carving itself a credible position of regional deterrence.