Russia seems to be stepping up efforts to build closer ties with Japan through cracks in Tokyo's alliance with the United States, even as it tries to resolve the thorny Northern Territories issue on terms favorable to Moscow.

Japan is in danger of playing right into the hands of Russia unless the new government of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and his Democratic Party of Japan establish firm diplomatic policies toward the colossal neighbor.

Shock waves spread to Washington after The New York Times on Aug. 27 published an article written by Hatoyama, who at the time was leading the DPJ to a general election victory. His article was somewhat critical of so-called American-led market fundamentalism and hinted that Japan should be less reliant on the U.S. and work closer with its Asian neighbors.

On Sept. 3, only three days after the general election and before he was officially named prime minister, Hatoyama was visited by two ambassadors: One, understandably, was John V. Roos of the U.S., and the other, somewhat surprisingly, was Mikhail M. Bely of Russia.

Russia's intention in taking full advantage of the DPJ's foreign policy shortfall initially was apparent behind Bely's praise of Hatoyama for the latter's "foresight" with regard to the beginning of a multipolar world.

Ever since the Soviet days, Russia's policy toward Japan has been based on the principle of separating political issues from economic matters. While seeking Japanese economic cooperation, Moscow has refused to budge an inch on the most controversial political subject: Japan's demand for the return of four islands off the coast of Hokkaido, which have been under Russian occupation since the closing days of World War II.

More often than not, Moscow showed some signs of making concessions on the territorial dispute while asking for economic cooperation from Japan, but once an economic deal appeared imminent, Japan ended up looking at the short end of the stick as Russia returned to an uncompromising stance.

As recently as last May, when Prime Minister Vladimir Putin came to Tokyo, he successfully signed a nuclear energy cooperation agreement with his Japanese counterpart. But upon his return to Moscow, Russia unleashed a broadside against Tokyo's policy toward Moscow.

When Ambassador Masaharu Kono presented his credentials to Putin late in May, the latter bitterly attacked a newly amended Japanese law that labeled the four northern islands as an integral part of Japan. In July, Putin suspended shipments of humanitarian aid goods from Japan to those living on some of the islands. Then, in August, Sergei M. Mironov, speaker of the Upper House of the Russian Parliament, visited the islands to impress Japan with Russia's sovereignty claim.

With Hatoyama now at the helm of government, it appears most likely that Russia will concentrate its tactics on the prime minister himself. One reason is that no politician in Japan has a closer relationship with Russia than he does. In 1956, his grandfather, Ichiro, who was prime minister at the time, signed the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration providing for the restoration of bilateral diplomatic relations. Moreover, the current prime minister is said to have close personal ties with important figures like Sergey Y. Naryshkin, chief of staff of the Russian government, and Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov. Hatoyama's son, Kiichiro, lives in Moscow with his family, studying at the University of Moscow.

All of these factors provide the Russian government with easy access to Hatoyama.

Another factor prompting Moscow to exert greater influence on the new Japanese prime minister is the Hatoyama government's fundamental posture of drafting basic diplomatic principles without relying on bureaucrats. Since the DPJ's election campaign manifesto makes little mention of the territorial dispute or other matters related to Russia, Hatoyama is in a position to exercise a free hand. This means that Moscow may have to deal only with Hatoyama, rather than, as in the past, with Foreign Ministry bureaucrats and ruling party politicians.

The recent tough stand taken by Russia toward Japan is also viewed against the background of what Moscow regards as its success in getting U.S. President Barack Obama to abandon the plan to build a missile defense system in Eastern Europe. Russian military experts have said that Moscow's threat to deploy missiles in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad played a role in persuading Obama to back off.

One Russian diplomatic source said that, on the strength of winning concessions from the U.S., Russia would adopt even a tougher stand than in the past against Japan. This could be interpreted as meaning that Moscow will press Hatoyama to agree to the return of only two of the four disputed islands — a proposal that Japan has steadfastly rejected.

It appears unlikely, however, that Moscow will play up the controversial territorial issue in its early dealings with Hatoyama. A more likely scenario would be to commend the new Japanese prime minister for his pro-Russian stance as an initial step in driving a wedge between Japan and the U.S. For that purpose, Russia will probably campaign for creating a multilateral security arrangement in Asia, as it has done in Europe. Hatoyama's pet theme of establishing an "East Asian Community" would be a perfect fit for such a scheme.

Russia has already begun its approach to Hatoyama and his government, as evidenced by the prompt call on the prime minister by Ambassador Bely. Following their meeting, Andrei Nesterenko, spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, told reporters that Moscow hopes that Hatoyama "will make the right decision like his grandfather."

President Dmitry Medvedev, too, said bilateral problems could be resolved only if both sides show readiness to compromise. This is interpreted as a suggestion that Japan should agree to the return of only two of the four disputed islands in the spirit of the joint declaration signed by Hatoyama's grandfather.

With Kremlin having started its cajole-Hatoyama campaign, the DPJ now faces the urgent task of clarifying its Russia policy if only to prevent Japan from playing right into the hands of Moscow.

This is an abridged translation of an article from the October issue of Sentaku, a monthly magazine covering Japanese political, social and economic scenes.