Japan’s relationship with Russia has received much attention this year after the latter’s sudden — yet, not unexpected — invasion of Ukraine.

But relations with Russia, and prior to that, the Soviet Union, have always been tense, as shown by several wars and border conflicts, as well as air and naval incursions, among others, over the years.

I am always amazed at just how bad Moscow's diplomacy is toward Japan, whether it was the Soviet Union's illegal seizure of the Northern Territories, its inhumane handling of Japanese prisoners of war and its repeated seizure of Japanese fishing boats. The list is long, as is the history.

Japan has been particularly bothered by Soviet and later Russian air incursions (as well as Chinese), often done in tandem or simultaneously. In recent years, the combined number of incursions by military aircraft has reached nearly 1,000 times annually and, in some cases, almost 1,200.

These are not new. For much of the Cold War as well, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force had to deal with the threat from the Soviets primarily in the north.

These incursions in fact began to occur even before the ASDF was established in 1954. Indeed, the incursions were one of the reasons for the creation of the Self-Defense Force's air wing.

The incursions, more importantly, also led to the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance by promoting greater interest in Japan’s defense by the United States, a rise in the budget for Japan’s defense, an increase in the equipment and aircraft to be provided to Japan and greater coordination between Tokyo and Washington.

In light of the impact of these aerial incursions, it would not be an exaggeration to describe the Soviet Union as "the father" of the ASDF. This is similar to China’s provocations toward Taiwan, which have raised international awareness about Taiwan’s plight; the situation with the Japanese administered Senkaku Islands; as well as an increasing defense awareness in Japan. We should almost feel grateful to those countries as their aggressive tactics have helped to raise the level of Japanese defensive capabilities and Japan-U.S. security cooperation over the years.

This was especially true in 1952. Soviet incursions stepped up dramatically after the San Francisco Peace Treaty, to which the Soviet Union was not a party, went into effect on April 28, 1952.

During the early fall, the situation had gotten so severe that the issue of defending against incursions was raised at the highest levels in Japan between U.S. forces (then known as the Far East Command) and the government of Japan. The latter was still basically externally defenseless at this point. It needed the United States, involved already in the Korean War, to properly deal with the threat.

Between Oct. 9 and Dec. 31, 1952, for example, there were 17 known violations of Japanese airspace by Soviet aircraft, several of which were reported in the Japanese press and thus becoming known to the general public.

Unfortunately, the United States was not prepared to properly deal with the threat then. Due to the Korean War, its forces and attention were primarily devoted to the conflict there and assets in Hokkaido were positioned in the southern part of the island rather than in the north. As such, the U.S. government was hesitant to issue a warning to the Soviets it was unable to enforce.

This American weakness was all too apparent to the Soviets. On Oct. 7, Soviet aircraft shot down an unarmed RB-29 Superfortress conducting reconnaissance over the Northern Territories, seized by the Soviet Union in September 1945 after Japan’s surrender. All eight crew members were killed.

The U.S. government exercised restraint and sought a diplomatic solution, eventually submitting the case to the International Court of Justice in 1955 when the Soviets displayed continued intransigence.

Further, there was concern within the U.S. government about triggering left-wing organizations in Japan opposed to the alliance and U.S. presence. They, like their descendants today, see U.S. bases/forces as a threat to Japan’s neighbors rather than being there, as explained by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in his remarks at the signing ceremony on Sept. 8, 1951, for defensive purposes.

“There should be no misunderstanding of the purpose of this Security Treaty. Its purpose is peace,” Acheson said. “The defense arrangements provided for under this Treaty will constitute a shield to protect the progress being made by the Japanese people toward better conditions of life. It will give the Japanese people the opportunity to continue their constructive work of building the new peaceful Japan, free from the paralyzing threat of aggression.”

It is unclear what the Soviet Union’s intentions were at the time of its repeated incursions. They may have been conducted to divide the newly created Japan-U.S. alliance or may have been to probe Japanese defenses or to stretch U.S. forces. Probably, it was all the above. Ironically, however, it led to the strengthening of the alliance, deepening of cooperation and the increase in Japanese dependence on the United States.

While neither then-U.S. Ambassador to Japan Robert Murphy nor Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida mention the issue specifically in their respective memoirs, intense coordination took place between the State Department, U.S. Embassy, U.S. Far Eastern Command, Japan’s Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Office. The degree of cooperation was admirable, one of the highlights of the emerging alliance.

The two governments coordinated not only international and domestic messaging (including the release of a statement by the Japanese government) and the contents of rules of engagement for shooting down or forcing the landing of Soviet aircraft, all done in a short time.

Further, the two countries developed plans for the ASDF, which had to be sped up in light of the increased incursions. As such, the ASDF was established in 1954, earlier than most experts and officials expected.

So, some 70 years after the incursions first began, a big spasibo (thank you) to Russia. It should, however, realize its provocative activities around Japan today, as in the past, will only further deepen cooperation between Japan and the United States, as well as with other like-minded countries in the region and in Europe. History does not lie.

Robert D. Eldridge is a former tenured associate professor of U.S.-Japan relations at Osaka University, former political adviser to the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa and the author of “The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem” (Routledge, 2001).