The release by North Korea of two Korean-American journalists is a welcome event. The two women broke the law, but incarceration was excessive punishment and their release was long overdue. The delay suggests the fate of these two women was determined by forces much larger than the details of their particular "crimes." The key question now is what comes next: Is this gesture part of a larger strategy by Pyongyang to re-engage the world, and the United States, in particular, and how will Washington and other nations respond?

Ms. Laura Ling and Ms. Euna Lee were arrested earlier this year when they crossed into North Korea from China as they reported on the fate of North Korean refugees. After a brief trial, they were convicted and sentenced to 12 years of labor, but they remained in a state guest house rather than being sent to prison. That alone suggests that North Korea planned all along to release the two women when circumstances were right.

Washington reportedly began back-channel discussions with Pyongyang to win their release immediately after they were detained. The arduous process was made immeasurably more difficult by North Korea's nuclear and missile tests, its withdrawal from multilateral denuclearization talks, United Nations sanctions, and injudicious remarks about the North Korean legal system and North Korea by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Add reports of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's ill health and efforts to secure the succession of his son and it is a wonder that the women were ever released.

Hints that Pyongyang might be ready to deal surfaced in late July when North Korea announced that it was prepared to talk to the U.S. "about the current situation." Messages were sent to the U.S. indicating that the right envoy would be given a visa, and the North suggested that former U.S. President Bill Clinton would fit the bill. He went, met Mr. Kim, and returned with the women.

The identification of Mr. Clinton as the right envoy is interesting and ironic. The only other former U.S. president to visit Pyongyang was Mr. Jimmy Carter, whose intervention defused the first U.S.-North Korea nuclear crisis in 1994 — reportedly much to the consternation of the Clinton administration. Washington and Pyongyang then agreed on a nuclear pact that froze the North's nuclear program as well as a missile moratorium. Then Secretary of State Madeline Albright visited Pyongyang, making her the highest-ranking U.S. official to make that trip, a gesture that was reciprocated by the visit of Gen. Jo Myong Rok to Washington in 1999. As he left office, Mr. Clinton was contemplating a visit to Pyongyang himself, but it never materialized.

The symbolism of Mr. Clinton's visit is two fold, and targets two different audiences. The first signal is to the Obama administration and the message is that Pyongyang is ready to do business and the relationship of the Clinton years — the high point of U.S.-North Korea relations — is possible. Also, rumors of Mr. Kim's ill health are exaggerated and he is in charge. The second message is for North Korean audiences. It draws a parallel between Mr. Clinton's visit and that of Mr. Carter: It cloaks Mr. Kim in his father's legacy, showing that he too commands international attention and that, like the Great Leader, only he can navigate the country through difficult diplomatic waters.

How will the U.S. respond? Thus far, the administration insists that there has been no change in its policy. The release of the women and North Korea's nuclear programs are separate issues. Washington demands that Pyongyang return to the six-party talks and honor pledges it made in that forum to completely eliminate its nuclear weapons program and give up its nuclear arms. Meanwhile, North Korea has said that it will not return to the six-party talks, that it will not give up its nuclear weapons until the U.S. abandons its "hostile party" — whatever that means — and it is only prepared to talk to Washington bilaterally. Looking at the two positions, it is hard to see common ground.

Humanitarian or not, we expect Mr. Clinton made the case for North Korea to return to negotiations and to change its behavior. We hope the U.S. is telling the truth when it says that Mr. Clinton's visit was private, that he made no deals, and that the U.S. remains committed to the six-party process and its goals. Resolution of the North Korean situation depends on the other five parties to the talks speaking to Pyongyang with one voice and insisting that it honor its promises. Maintaining that united front requires trust among the five. That asset had been dwindling, especially between Washington and Tokyo and Seoul. It also requires a common understanding of the situation — an understanding that becomes more difficult when Pyongyang demonstrates flexibility.

Some will look to the Clinton visit for ways Japan can handle its problems with North Korea, in particular the fate of the abductees. But the parallels are inexact at best, misleading at worst. The most important lesson is to keep focused on the big goal — North Korea's denuclearization. While keeping priorities straight, Japan should do its utmost to find ways to solve the abduction issue.