Almost a decade before the March 2011 quake and tsunami triggered the triple core meltdown at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant, Ko Fujii knew the government could not effectively communicate the risks of nuclear technology.
He should know — back then, Fujii was a government bureaucrat in the then-Science and Technology Agency whose job was to design nuclear technology policy. This included liability legislation for the fatal 1999 criticality accident at a uranium-processing plant in the village of Tokai, Ibaraki Prefecture — the site of Japan’s first nuclear accident resulting in deaths by radiation exposure.
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