On Aug. 15, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will give a much-anticipated speech commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. This presents a golden opportunity to hit the reset button on regional relations and to generate momentum toward overcoming history driven tensions that plague East Asia.

Sources close to Abe suggest that he won't issue an apology, nor condemn Japan's colonial aggression or what the 1995 Murayama statement called "mistaken national policy," but will express "deep remorse." Abe calculates, probably correctly, that this will suffice for his audience outside East Asia, but doing so would surely vex China and South Korea and that means missing a historic opportunity to promote reconciliation with the two nations that suffered most from Japanese imperialism.

In a recent conversation with Kazuhiko Togo about his new book, "Kiki no Gaiko" ("Diplomacy in Crisis"), the ambassador explained why it would make eminent sense for Abe to be suitably humble and contrite about the country's shared history with Asia.

If the prime minister could understand how apology is empowering and could restore dignity to Japan and its victims, he could deliver a powerful statement that would change how people view him. That could possibly pave the way to overcoming various issues that divide the region. The August speech will be Abe's chance to rise above his rigid revisionist views and act like a statesman who puts the national interest ahead of his own private agenda.

It would be an act of proactive diplomacy, Abe setting the agenda and taking the initiative that would force Beijing and Seoul to either respond in kind or look churlish. Abe's preference for proactive pacifism relies on beefing up security cooperation with the United States and lifting constitutional constraints on Japan's military, but surely more vigorous diplomacy is essential to easing the regional tensions that cause anxiety in Japan. And this would be vastly preferable to the Japanese public than the collective self-defense legislation that Abe is now ramming through the Diet.

In recent months there has been a visible warming in regional relations and Abe could give this trend significant momentum. A recent deal with South Korea over the UNESCO World Heritage designation for Meiji Era factories and mines hinged on Tokyo agreeing to place signs indicating that Koreans were forced to work at the sites. This compromise indicates the possibilities for diplomacy, though subsequent undignified pettifogging over whether "forced to work" means "forced labor" suggests some Japanese conservatives remain resolutely recalcitrant. As Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder argue in their superb book "The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash," Tokyo is better off in all sorts of ways when ties with Seoul are stronger, so the cooperation on the World Heritage site is a shared, but alas rare, victory for common sense.

All signs are that Abe has no intention of making a suitably humble speech in August and will probably miss the opportunity to burnish his legacy and reassure his critics that he is not a nationalist zealot. Togo believes it would be a mistake not to surprise everyone because it would establish favorable conditions for making progress on overcoming issues ranging from Yasukuni Shrine, the "comfort women" and forced labor to the thornier territorial disputes with Russia, South Korea and China.

Historical issues are easier to sort out because they involve perceptions and interpretations, what Togo calls conceptual differences. Compromise is inherently easier than it is over territorial claims where the geopolitical implications work against concessions. But if Abe can harvest the low-hanging fruit on history, this might open up possibilities for overcoming territorial disputes.

Togo presents a road map that lays out what should be done and he optimistically asserts that within two years many of these divisive problems can be overcome. In his view, Abe, "the prince of hardliner nationalists," is uniquely positioned to deal with these disputes precisely because his nationalist credentials are unquestioned and he is the only one who could rally conservatives to support such bold moves.

Many commentators argue that Abe needs to listen to his inner German in dealing with historical controversies, but Togo makes a convincing case that he should be listening to his inner Nixon. He points out that, in the early 1970s, U.S. President Richard Nixon made breakthroughs with the Soviet Union in pursuing detente and normalizing relations with China, initiatives that hardly seemed likely for a politician who made his name as a red-baiting right-winger. By pragmatically extending an olive branch to Japan's neighbors, Abe could end Japan's regional isolation.

In 2006, Abe showed the world what he is capable of when as the newly elected prime minister he made his first overseas trip to Beijing to repair relations that his predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi, derailed by repeated visits to Yasukuni Shrine. That was the pragmatic Abe doing what needed to be done to serve the national interest. That's who Japan needs to show up on Aug. 15: An Abe who can demonstrate patience and persistence in engaging his counterparts.

For Abe, forthrightly taking the measure of history would help him recover some of the political capital he has squandered in mismanaging Diet deliberations over his collective self-defense legislation. The arrogance and hubris on display combined with evasive explanations have eroded his public support. Ironically, attesting to his weak powers of persuasion, the Japanese public seems more anxious about giving Abe his way on security than it is about regional threats.

In June this year and in the autumn of 2012, Tokyo and Seoul got to the altar on the comfort women issue, but at the last moment couldn't seal the deal. That means the divide between the two sides is narrow and bridgeable with sufficient political leadership. Whatever Abe thinks about the comfort women, he has a chance to restore dignity to the less than 50 Korean comfort women who remain alive and in doing so greatly improve Japan's international image. Seoul's cooperation is essential, but that depends on a humble mea culpa by Abe.

Yasukuni Shrine represents another issue that Abe is uniquely placed to manage. There are various proposals to depoliticize honoring Japan's war dead and while this is deliberated a moratorium on Yasukuni visits by Cabinet ministers would be a welcome gesture of reconciliation. The forced labor issue might be trickier because, in Togo's view, a counterproductive judicial war is raging in South Korean courts awarding damages against Japanese firms, and Seoul will need to defuse this situation. I think this might be easier against the backdrop of a Diet resolution of apology and establishment of something akin to the German Foundation for Remembrance, Responsibility and Future, which pooled private and public sector funds to compensate Nazi Germany's forced laborers and fund research and educational initiatives.

This is the type of proactive diplomacy that would yield Japan rich dividends. We already know that self-righteous nationalism is a dead-end, isn't it time for Abe to show some guts? Togo advises Abe to understand the key role of the Murayama statement in enhancing Japan's stature and relationships in Asia, and act in that spirit, because being reasonable and pragmatic will best serve the national interest.

Jeff Kingston is the director of Asian Studies, Temple University Japan.