SOFIA — The post-Cold War order in Europe is finished, with Vladimir Putin its executioner. Russia's invasion of Georgia only marked its passing. Russia has emerged as a born-again 19th-century power determined to challenge the intellectual, moral and institutional foundations of the order.
Today, Russia and the European Union have sharply opposing views on the sources of instability in Eurasia. If the West persists in ignoring Russia's concerns and continues to expand NATO in the post-Soviet space, it will merely reintroduce sphere-of-influence politics in Eurasia. But breaking with the policies of the 1990s also presents grave risks, because the EU is not, and cannot be, a traditional great power, and because the West's weakness may end up rewarding — and encouraging — Russian revanchism.
Any re-thinking of EU policy toward Russia should recognize that, while Russia will remain a regional power and global player during the next decade, it is unlikely to become a liberal democracy. The EU should also recognize that Russia has legitimate concerns about the asymmetric impact of the Cold War's end on its security. Russia felt betrayed in its expectations that the Cold War's end would mean the demilitarization of Central and Eastern Europe.