Like U.S. President Bill Clinton before him, Japanese Prime Minister Mori has just completed a trip to South Asia that has been high on hope and symbolism but disappointingly low on results. Both leaders argued that it was important to engage India and Pakistan in order to revive the global nonproliferation movement, which was seriously set back when first India and then Pakistan conducted nuclear-weapons tests in May 1998. But neither saw much progress in this direction, despite the considerable leverage both possess, given the desperate need both South Asian states have for economic assistance and investment, not to mention renewed international respectability.
The best that either leader could achieve was a pledge to refrain from new nuclear tests, something both states had already promised before the visits. What was needed, at a minimum, was a commitment to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and agreement not to operationally deploy nuclear weapons. The latter is particularly important. Once these weapons are put in the field under local commanders, the risk of inadvertent (or purposeful) use goes up considerably.
It is, of course, too late to undo the trips. But the United States and Japan must take note of some of the unintended consequences of these high-level visits to prevent further damage from being done.