The impression that one gets when looking at the evolution of Japan's security policy in recent years is that the Japanese public has consented to steps taken by Tokyo. After all, that is the fundamental expectation that democracies nurture. Following this reasoning, Tokyo should be developing a security policy that mirrors the public will. However, a very strong case can be made from survey data that Tokyo is not paying as much attention as it should to public sentiment pertaining to Japan's security policy.
This raises the question of the extent to which Tokyo is complying with Washington's expectations of Japanese security policy. The rape of a young Okinawan schoolgirl by three U.S. servicemen in early September 1995 set in motion an unexpected flurry of popular opposition to the Japan-U.S. security arrangement. Many Japanese questioned the usefulness of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Although this opposition already existed, the rape incident brought to the surface political outrage that had been harbored by many Japanese.
Between August 1995 and April 1997, Nihon Keizai Shimbun conducted four surveys that straightforwardly queried respondents on the bilateral security treaty. In all of these surveys, respondents were asked the same question: What do you think of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty? Designed so as to minimize ambiguity, these surveys gave respondents only three possible selections, which were it should be maintained, it should be abolished or can't tell/don't know.