THE GEOPOLITICS OF EAST ASIA: The Search for Equilibrium, by Robyn Lim. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, 208 pp., £65 (cloth).

East Asia is a dangerous neighborhood and thus professor Robyn Lim admonishes Japanese leaders to abandon "head in the sand" pacifism and acknowledge that at the dawn of the 21st century there are no risk-free security choices and that the Cold War "free ride" cannot continue. Here are the security views of an Australian firmly planted on the Heritage Foundation/Margaret Thatcher axis.

"Geopolitics" focuses on how geographical and historical forces shape international relations in the region and provides a brisk diplomatic history stretching from the roots of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 through to current jockeying over the Korean Peninsula. Lim argues that since 1905 there have been four key actors -- China, Japan, Russia and the United States -- that have actively tried to influence the regional balance of power. She suggests that U.S. policies are driven by its interest in maintaining a regional power equilibrium and the strategic security of Japan. Of course, one nation's equilibrium is another's hegemony.

In Lim's East Asia, the name of the game is power brandished with brio and rooted in realpolitik; like Teddy Roosevelt (America's 26th president) she believes in carrying a big stick and acting assertively. She admires leaders who unapologetically act to secure national interests, but it is not always clear how one can define those interests nor what will work. Josef Stalin emerges from these pages as a far greater statesman and more adroit practitioner of geopolitics than Jimmy Carter. She writes, "The confidence of U.S. allies at both ends of Eurasia was rocked by one of the most strategically inept administrations in U.S. history. Evincing a visceral distaste for 'power politics,' Carter employed a misplaced moralism by which human rights were placed at the forefront of U.S. policy." U.S. policies toward the Korean Peninsula are derided as "Carter's follies" since he believed that reducing the threat level might induce North Korea to negotiate directly with South Korea.