Mercifully, we are long past the time when a book like this focused on a Japanese exceptionalism that bordered on cultural mumbo-jumbo. Instead, this volume, the third in a series of national negotiating styles by the United States Institute of Peace, examines Japanese negotiating behavior through a narrow lens -- bilateral U.S.-Japan government-to-government talks -- and sticks to the facts as the authors see them. The result is best considered an introduction to the subject -- a prelude to the more comprehensive study, one that relies on Japanese contributors, that has yet to be written.
The authors concede as much, acknowledging that even these cases aren't typical. Negotiations with the U.S. are sui generis for Japan, and these examples are not high profile or the most highly charged. I would even venture that the final example, the renegotiation of the U.S.-Japan security relationship from 1991 to 1996, might not even be a "negotiation." Rather it was a process, with no fixed end point or destination. It is unlikely that the two sides even thought of what they were doing as a single "negotiation." Events obliged both sides to change objectives and course as they proceeded. And, as a final quasi-criticism, it should be pointed out that while the two authors (Ezra Vogel and Paul Giarra) were deeply involved in the effort to recast the relationship, the case study still lacks insight into Japanese thinking. But, as noted, this useful volume is just an introduction.
The other chapters focus on negotiations over orange imports (1977-88), rice imports (1986-93) and the contentious debate over the FSX (Fighter Support Experimental) aircraft that was to be developed by the two countries (1985-89); Blaker, perhaps the pre-eminent U.S. student of Japanese negotiating behavior, wrote each of them.