THE ORIGINS OF THE BILATERAL OKINAWA PROBLEM: Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952, by Robert D. Eldridge. Garland Publishing, Inc., New York & London, 2001, 280 pp., $85.00 (cloth)

Of all the issues plaguing Japan's relationship with the United States, none is as contentious as the U.S. troop presence on Okinawa. Since the rape of a 12-year-old schoolgirl by three U.S. servicemen in 1995, every criminal act committed by a U.S. soldier has made headlines, fueling local anger and resentment and, more importantly, reawakening the debate in both the U.S. and Japan over the reason for the U.S. presence in not only Okinawa but all of East Asia.

A dozen years after the end of the Cold War in Europe, North and South Korean troops stare each other down in Panmunjong, while the president of the U.S. declares China a strategic competitor and says the U.S. will defend Taiwan. Meanwhile, lingering memories of Japanese aggression throughout Asia remain strong, and the country's every action related to the period, from revising textbooks to the prime minister's visit to Yasukuni Shrine, are seen as proof that Japan cannot be entirely trusted to act on its own.

Thus, the conventional wisdom argues, Asia is still a dangerous place and Okinawa, by virtue of geography, is the most important port in any potential political storm. Only the U.S. Air Force at Kadena can supply logistical support and reserve forces to U.S. troops guarding South Korea. Only the U.S. presence in Okinawa will keep the Chinese from grabbing Taiwan, the Senkaku or the Spratly Islands. And only the U.S. presence on Okinawa will ensure that the Japanese military genie remains firmly inside the bottle.