How will the Egyptian Army's coup against the elected Muslim Brotherhood government affect Islamism — intellectually and politically the most consequential Mideastern movement since the 1960s? Do the brethren see their fall as a rejection of their religious beliefs? Should they?
Historically, it's impossible to imagine Islamic militancy without the Brotherhood. Founded in 1928 against British imperialism and a rapidly Westernizing Egypt, the Brotherhood became the flagship for Sunni fundamentalism. Secretive but populist, contemptuous of state-paid clergy, intellectually syncretistic (socialism, fascism and European anti-Semitism blended into their "authentic" faith), the brethren became widely popular in Egypt as the army's experimentation with radical Arabism and crony capitalism failed.
The real strength of the Brotherhood movement, along the Nile and beyond, has always been its public faith and private virtue and its appealing historical narrative for Muslims who see the prophet Muhammad as a paragon — a people's greatness flows from moral rectitude. The downfall of the general-turned-president Hosni Mubarak two years ago caught the brethren off guard.