U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently announced that North Korea will soon release its much anticipated (and long overdue) "complete and correct declaration" of all its nuclear activities. In return, the Bush administration will remove Pyongyang from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list and Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) restrictions; actions that could be reversed if the North's list proved to be inadequate or if cooperation on verification was "insufficient."

Some have argued that it would make more sense to wait until the list is delivered and verified before restrictions are lifted, and they are probably right. Unfortunately, that was not what Washington promised. If we have learned nothing else about North Korea we should know one thing by now: While Pyongyang might not be too good at living up to its own promises, it will not budge an inch if it perceives that others are not living up to theirs.

As a result, it is useful to review what has actually been promised, first during the landmark September 2005 six-party talks joint statement and later during two "breakthrough" declarations that took place in February and October of 2007.