TIMBUKTU, MALI – In their hurry to flee Timbuktu last month, al-Qaida fighters left behind a crucial document: Tucked under a pile of papers and trash was a confidential letter spelling out the terrorist network’s strategy to conquer northern Mali and reflecting internal discord over how to rule the region.
The document offers an unprecedented window into the terrorist operation, indicating that al-Qaida predicted the military intervention that would dislodge it in January and recognized its own vulnerability.
The letter also shows a sharp division within al-Qaida’s African chapter, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), over how quickly and how strictly to apply Islamic law, with its senior commander expressing dismay over the whipping of women and the destruction of Timbuktu’s ancient monuments.
It further leaves no doubt that despite a temporary withdrawal into the desert, al-Qaida plans to operate in the region over the long haul and is willing to make short-term concessions on ideology to gain the allies it acknowledges that it needs.
The more than nine-page document, found in a building occupied by AQIM Islamic extremists for almost a year, is signed by Abu Musab Abdul Wadud, the nom de guerre of Abdelmalek Droukdel, the senior commander appointed by Osama bin Laden to run al-Qaida’s branch in Africa.
The clear-headed, point-by-point assessment resembles a memo from a CEO to his top managers and lays out for his jihadists in Mali what they have done wrong in months past, and what they need to do to correct their behavior in the future.
Droukdel, the emir of AQIM, perhaps surprisingly argues that his fighters moved too fast and too brutally in applying Shariah law to northern Mali. Comparing the relationship of al-Qaida to Mali as that of an adult to an infant, he urges his fighters to be more gentle, like a parent.
“The current baby is in its first days, crawling on its knees, and has not yet stood on its two legs,” Droukdel writes. “If we really want it to stand on its own two feet in this world full of enemies waiting to pounce, we must ease its burden, take it by the hand, help it and support it until it stands.”
He scolds his fighters for being too forceful and warns that if they don’t ease off, their entire project could be thrown into jeopardy: “Every mistake in this important stage of the life of the baby will be a heavy burden on his shoulders. The larger the mistake, the heavier the burden on his back, and we could end up suffocating him suddenly and causing his death.”
The letter is divided into six chapters, three of which were recovered, along with loose pages, on the floor of the Ministry of Finance’s Regional Audit Department. Residents say the building, one of several AQIM extremists took over in the ancient city of sun-dried, mud-brick homes, was particularly well-guarded with two checkpoints and a zigzag of barriers at the entrance.
Droukdel’s letter is one of only a few internal documents between AQIM commanders that have been found, and possibly the first to be made public, according to University of Toulouse Islamic scholar Mathieu Guidere.
The letter was numbered 33/234, a system reserved for al-Qaida’s internal communications, said Guidere, who helps oversee a database of documents generated by extremists, including Droukdel.
“This is a document between the Islamists that has never been put before the public eye,” said Guidere, who authenticated the letter after being sent a two-page sample. “It confirms something very important, which is the divisions about the strategic conception of the organization. There was a debate on how to establish an Islamic state in north Mali and how to apply Shariah (law).”
While the pages recovered are not dated, a reference to a conflict in June establishes that the letter was sent at most eight months ago.
Their tone and timing suggest that al-Qaida is learning from its mistakes in places such as Somalia and Algeria, where attempts to unilaterally impose its extremist version of Islam backfired. They also reflect the influence of the Arab Spring, which showed the power of people to break regimes and turned on its head al-Qaida’s long-held view that only violence could bring about wholesale change, Guidere said.
The letter suggests a change in the thinking, if not the rhetoric, of Droukdel, who is asking his men to behave with a restraint that he himself is not known for. Droukdel is believed to have overseen numerous suicide bombings, including the 2007 twin car bombing of the United Nations offices and a new government building in Algiers that killed 41 people. The same year, the U.S. designated him a global terrorist and banned Americans from doing business with him.
In a video disseminated on jihadist forums a few months ago, Droukdel dared the French to intervene in Mali and said his men would turn the region into a “graveyard” for foreign fighters, according to a transcript provided by the Washington-based SITE Intelligence Group.
The fanaticism he exhibits in his public statements is in stark contrast to the advice he gives his men on the ground. In his private letter, Droukdel acknowledges that al-Qaida is vulnerable to a foreign intervention and that international and regional pressure “exceeds our military and financial and structural capability for the time being.”
“It is very probable, perhaps certain, that a military intervention will occur . . . which in the end will either force us to retreat to our rear bases or will provoke the people against us,” writes Droukdel. “Taking into account this important factor, we must not go too far or take risks in our decisions or imagine that this project is a stable Islamic state.”
According to his own online biography, Droukdel, 44, was born into a religious family in the Algerian locality of Zayan. He says he enrolled into the technology department of a local university before turning to jihad, and that his first job was making explosives for Algerian mujahedeen. In 2006, the group to which he belonged, known as the GSPC, became an arm of al-Qaida after negotiations with Ayman al-Zawahri, bin Laden’s lieutenant.
As Droukdel rose through the ranks, he came into direct contact with bin Laden, according to Guidere.
In the document found in Timbuktu, Droukdel cites a letter he received from bin Laden about the al-Hudaybiyah deal, a treaty signed circa 628 by the Prophet Muhammad and the Quraish tribe of Mecca, an agreement with non-Muslims that paved the way for Muslims to return to Mecca.
“The smart Muslim leader would do these kinds of concessions in order to achieve the word of God eventually and to support the religion,” he says.
Perhaps the biggest concession Droukdel urges is for his fighters to slow down in implementing Shariah.
When the Islamic extremists took over northern Mali 10 months ago, they restored order in a time of chaos, much as the Taliban did in Afghanistan, and even created a hotline number for people to report crimes.
But whatever goodwill they had built up evaporated when they started to destroy the city’s historic monuments, amputate the limbs of suspected thieves and whip women for not covering up.
“One of the wrong policies that we think you carried out is the extreme speed with which you applied Shariah, not taking into consideration the gradual evolution that should be applied in an environment that is ignorant of religion,” Droukdel writes.
“Our previous experience proved that applying Shariah this way, without taking the environment into consideration, will lead to people rejecting the religion, and engender hatred toward the mujahedeen, and will consequently lead to the failure of our experiment.”
Droukdel goes on to cite two specific applications of Shariah that he found problematic. He criticizes the destruction of Timbuktu’s World Heritage-listed shrines, because, as he says, “on the internal front we are not strong.”
He also tells AQIM fighters that he disapproves of their religious punishment for adulterers — stoning to death — and their lashing of people, as well as “the fact that you prevented women from going out, and prevented children from playing, and searched the houses of the population.”
“Your officials need to control themselves,” he warns.
Droukdel’s words reflect the division within one of al-Qaida’s most ruthless affiliates and may explain why Timbuktu, under the thumb of AQIM, experienced a slightly less brutal version of Islamic law than that imposed in Gao, one of the three other major cities controlled by the extremists.
There was only one amputation in Timbuktu over their 10-month rule, compared to a dozen or more in Gao, a city governed by the al-Qaida offshoot Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, which does not report to Droukdel.
Droukdel’s warning of rejection from locals also turned out to be prescient, as Shariah ran its course in Timbuktu.
The breaking point, residents say, was the day last June when the jihadists descended on the cemetery with pickaxes and shovels and smashed the tombs of local saints, decrying what they called the sin of idolatry. Many in Timbuktu say that was the point of no return.
“When they smashed our mausoleums, it hurt us deeply,” said Alpha Sanechirfi, director of the Malian Office of Tourism in Timbuktu. “For us, it was game over.”
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