MANILA – After years of fighting the government from hidden jungle bases in the southern Philippines, an al-Qaida-linked militant group is facing a new adversary: fellow Muslim insurgents who can match their guerrilla battle tactics and are eager to regain their lost stature by fighting the widely condemned terrorist group.
The emerging enmity between militants of the Abu Sayyaf al-Qaida offshoot and the larger Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) rebels could bolster a decade-long campaign by the Philippines and its Western allies to isolate Abu Sayyaf, which remains one of the most dangerous groups in Southeast Asia.
In their first known major clash, Abu Sayyaf gunmen battled MNLF rebels in fighting last week, killing at least 22 combatants in the mountainous jungles of southern Jolo Island. One MNLF rebel was beheaded — Abu Sayyaf’s signature act.
Bonded by blood ties and war, the two armed groups had coexisted for years on Jolo in a predominantly Muslim region, where abject poverty, guns and weak law enforcement have combined in an explosive mix to fuel their rebellions and pockets of lawlessness.
The trouble began after the MNLF rebels — seeking to regain their former dominance in the region — tried to arrange the release of several hostages held by Abu Sayyaf, including a prominent Jordanian TV journalist and two European tourists. When Abu Sayyaf commanders refused to free the hostages, MNLF rebels launched an attack.
The MNLF rebels are now trying to rescue the captives and end Abu Sayyaf’s reign, MNLF commander Khabier Malik said.
For years, a shadowy alliance is believed to have existed between the groups. While the MNLF signed a limited peace deal with the government years ago, some of its commanders are suspected of giving sanctuary to Abu Sayyaf rebels and carrying out kidnappings for ransom with them.
“Collusion between the Abu Sayyaf group and (MNLF) members — many of whom are relatives — on Jolo is a major reason why large swaths of the island have been essentially ungovernable for years,” said Bryony Lau of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group think tank.
But the rift offers no easy opportunities. Weaning the MNLF rebels from hardened militants would mean a true government alliance with the insurgents, some of whom are suspected of involvement in attacks on civilians and government forces.
Walking a tightrope amid the clashes, President Benigno Aquino III said the MNLF offensive was not sanctioned by his government. But government officials also are not trying to stop the fighting, presumably hoping each group weakens the other.
The MNLF spearheaded an underground movement in the early 1970s for a separatist Islamic state. But it dropped its secessionist goal when it accepted limited autonomy for minority Muslims in the predominantly Roman Catholic nation’s south, prompting key guerrillas to break away — including a Libyan-educated radical who established Abu Sayyaf.
Another major guerrilla bloc broke off from the original MNLF group and formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which has emerged as the country’s largest Muslim rebel group.
The MNLF rebels were not required to disarm under the landmark 1996 peace deal, allowing fighters to settle back into their Jolo communities with their weapons. The accord also lacked a provision to formally enlist the rebels in hunting down criminals and terrorists straying into their strongholds, an oversight that may have helped foster collusion years later between the MNLF rebels and Abu Sayyaf.
Philippine officials forged such a pact in peace talks with the MILF with impressive results. Hunted by U.S.-backed Filipino troops in 2005, Abu Sayyaf chieftain Khadaffy Janjalani and other militants sought refuge in a MILF stronghold that turned them away. Janjalani, then among the most-wanted terrorist suspects in Southeast Asia, was killed by troops the following year on Jolo.
Abu Sayyaf — meaning “bearer of the sword” in Arabic — was founded with funds and training believed to come from a collection of Asian and Middle-Eastern radical groups, including al-Qaida. It came to U.S. attention in 2001 when it kidnapped three Americans, one of whom was beheaded, along with dozens of Filipinos and swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden’s movement.
The kidnappings prompted Washington to deploy hundreds of troops to the southern Philippines in 2002 to train Manila’s forces and share intelligence, helping the military capture or kill most of Abu Sayyaf’s top commanders. Now without a central leader, the group has fewer than 400 armed fighters, whom the military says are constantly on the run from U.S.-backed local offensives.
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